Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business
Volume 33 | Issue 1

Fall 2012

A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust
Interface
Thomas K. Cheng

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Recommended Citation
Thomas K. Cheng, A Developmental Approach to the Patent-Antitrust Interface, 33 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 1 (2012).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol33/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

A Developmental Approach to the
Patent-Antitrust Interface
By Thomas K. Cheng*
Abstract: This Article proposes a set of guiding principles for approaching the
patent-antitrust interface in developing countries. Based on the notion that
antitrust doctrines need to be adjusted to reflect the local economic
circumstances, this Article argues that any credible approach to the patentantitrust interface in developing countries must incorporate development
considerations. It proposes a set of guiding principles that takes into account a
wide range of factors, including the need to provide innovation incentives, the
need to facilitate domestic imitation, the need to protect domestic consumer
welfare, and the need to safeguard access to basic necessities. With the support
of a considerable body of theoretical and empirical economic literature, this
Article challenges the widely held belief that patent protection is necessary for
securing innovations. Rather, this Article argues that developing countries need
to be skeptical about innovation-based justifications for restrictive patent
exploitation practices, as many of them do not possess the capacity to take
advantage of innovation incentives and can ill-afford to sacrifice consumer
welfare. It concludes by highlighting the implicit challenge this Article poses to
the drive for convergence that has dominated international antitrust in the last
decade.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The patent-antitrust interface is one of the most complex and vexing
areas of antitrust law. Professor Louis Kaplow characterizes it as “a source
of perpetual confusion and controversy” and as a conflict “even more deepseated than is generally perceived.”1 This conflict stems from the fact that
antitrust law prohibits the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power
through exclusionary means while patent rights confer market power.
Furthermore, it is said that antitrust law is chiefly concerned with static
efficiency—the short-run price-cost performance of markets—and patent
law with dynamic efficiency—the generation of patentee reward to spur
innovation. Commentators in the established antitrust jurisdictions, most of
which are developed countries, have proposed various ways to resolve this
conflict. Some give primacy to competition while others emphasize the
importance of pursuing dynamic efficiency.2 Yet others advocate solutions
that require careful balancing of the policy considerations underpinning
these two bodies of law.3 For example, Professor Louis Kaplow proposed a
ratio test that determines the legality of a patent exploitation practice with
reference to its relative impact on the consumer welfare loss and patentee
reward. Despite repeated attempts to formulate a definitive approach to the
patent-antitrust interface, success has so far eluded most commentators.
Reconciling patent and antitrust policies is even more difficult for
developing countries.
Patent policy has crucial implications for
development, as technological progress drives economic growth. While the
implications may seem to be that developing countries should emphasize
patent policy, as they are further behind the global technological frontier
and are in desperate need of domestic innovation, they can ill afford the
short-term consumer welfare loss that must be incurred to generate patentee
reward. Given the widespread poverty in many developing countries, their
consumers would be hard-pressed to bear the supra-competitive prices that
1
Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1813, 1815–16 (1984).
2
Ward Bowman, Jr. was one of the leading proponents of minimal competition law
restrictions on the exercise of IPRs, while William Baxter advocated a stronger role for
competition law in regulating the exercise of patent rights. See generally William F. Baxter,
Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE
L.J. 267 (1966); WARD S. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW (1973).
3
See Kaplow, supra note 1.
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create innovation incentives.4 Developing countries seem to be in a bind.
Their antitrust enforcement authorities should be careful about sacrificing
consumer welfare by upholding patent exploitation practices.
To complicate matters further, many developing countries possess
negligible technological capacity. They have no meaningful prospects of
attracting domestic innovations.
The need to generate innovation
incentives, which underpins one side of the balance in the patent-antitrust
interface, is weak. This means that antitrust law should be even more
hesitant to sacrifice consumer welfare as the innovation incentives
generated by the patent system will not induce significant domestic
innovation. The most realistic way for these countries to acquire
technological capacity is to allow domestic producers to imitate foreign
technology, which will endow these producers with the technical capability
to pursue innovations in the future. This means that patent protection
should be lowered to facilitate imitation and licensing on favorable terms to
the local producers. Finally, patent policy affects the incentives of
multinational firms to transfer technology to, and undertake investment in,
developing countries. Foreign direct investment (FDI), in particular, may
create significant benefits for the host economy in the form of increased
employment, capital stock growth, and transfer of managerial know-how,
all of which significantly contribute to economic growth and development.
Developing countries must, hence, pay close attention to how the patentantitrust interface may affect FDI and technology transfer. Lastly, the
patent-antitrust interface in a developing country must incorporate
developmental considerations, such as access to medicine and other basic
necessities, which often hold the key to poverty alleviation and economic
development.
Given these complex and sometimes conflicting
considerations, some guiding principles are needed to approach the patentantitrust interface in developed countries.
This Article is divided into eight parts. Part II reviews some of the
literature on the patent-antitrust interface from the two most established
antitrust jurisdictions—the United States and the European Union (EU).
The review concludes with the observation that resolution of the patentantitrust conflict must entail a balancing of some kind between static and
dynamic efficiencies. Part III provides the groundwork for adapting the
balancing approach for developing countries by defining the meaning of
economic growth and development as they pertain to the patent-antitrust
interface. This Part concludes with a summary of the main developmental
considerations to be incorporated in the proposed guiding principles. Part
IV examines the widely-held belief that patent protection is necessary for
securing innovations, and argues, with the support of a considerable amount
4

For a discussion of the definition of innovation incentives or incentives to innovate, see
infra Part III.A.2.
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of theoretical and empirical literature, that the belief is generally mistaken.
The extent to which the belief is true depends on the industry at issue. Part
V investigates the relationships between the patent-antitrust interface and
the three main forms of technology transfer: trade of technological goods,
FDI, and technology licensing, and suggests ways in which patent-antitrust
rules should take these relationships into account. Part VI introduces three
further considerations for the patent-antitrust interface in developing
countries: consumer welfare and deadweight loss, impaired access to basic
necessities, and stifling of domestic innovation. Part VII integrates all of
the issues highlighted in the previous parts and puts forward some guiding
principles for tackling the patent-antitrust interface in developing countries.
Part VIII addresses two main criticisms of the proposed guiding principles:
its compatibility with the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement and administrability. Part IX concludes the
Article.
II.

RESOLVING THE PATENT-ANTITRUST CONFLICT—
BALANCING STATIC AND DYNAMIC EFFICIENCIES
The interface with patent law is one of the most challenging and
technical areas of antitrust.5 What makes it so challenging is the fact that it
juxtaposes two bodies of law that have ostensibly conflicting policy
objectives, the reconciliation of which requires delicate balancing.
Generally speaking, the focus of patent law is to encourage innovations by
giving potential inventors a limited period of exclusivity so that they may
recoup their investment through supra-competitive pricing. Meanwhile,
antitrust law protects consumer welfare by ensuring that firms compete on
the merits and that consumers obtain goods and services at the lowest price
and highest quality attainable in a competitive market. In economic terms,
patent law pursues dynamic efficiency, which is concerned with the
generation of innovation over time, while antitrust law focuses on static
efficiency, which is determined by the price-cost performance of the market
at one point in time. It should be obvious that there is an ostensible conflict
5

Many scholarly articles have been written about this area of law. See generally Baxter,
supra note 2; Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH L. REV. 37 (2009); Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability,
88 TEX. L. REV. 253 (2009); Josef Drexl, Real Knowledge is to Know the Extent of One’s
Own Ignorance: On the Consumer Harm Approach in Innovation-Related Competition
Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 677 (2009); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical
Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006);
Kaplow, supra note 1; David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment
Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303 (2010); Willard K. Tom
& Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to
Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167 (1997); Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and
Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450 (1969).
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between the means by which patent law promotes innovation—supracompetitive pricing during the exclusivity period—and the antitrust
objective of securing low prices for consumers.
It has been argued, however, that this conflict is more apparent than
real.6 Antitrust law pays attention to both static and dynamic efficiencies,
and recognizes that the greatest welfare gains come not from competitiondriven lower prices for goods and services, but from technological
advances.7 Meanwhile, patent law also considers the effects of patent
exclusivity on consumers. Implicit in the determination of the length and
scope of patent rights is a balance between generating innovation incentives
and allowing consumers affordable access to new technologies.8 Professor
Herbert Hovenkamp argues that the conflict between patent and antitrust
laws is “readily exaggerated.”9 With the two bodies of law sharing a
common set of policy considerations, the resolution of the conflict between
them, if one exists, can be achieved through a weighing of these
considerations.10 The challenge is to create sufficient reward to potential
innovators without unduly restricting consumers’ access to new
technologies.
This commonality of policy focus should not be exaggerated, however.
Despite their shared concerns about static and dynamic efficiencies, patent
and antitrust laws take different approaches to weighing these efficiencies.
Patent law’s main focus remains the provision of innovation incentives,
which spawns corollary issues, such as patentability and the scope of patent
rights.11 Despite the need to balance innovation incentives and consumer
welfare loss, rarely is consumer welfare explicitly considered in patent
cases. If consumer welfare was ever explicitly weighed, it was at the
legislative stage when Congress determined the length and scope of patent
protection.12 Judges tend to see patent issues, such as non-obviousness, as
6

SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 161 (2004).
HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., 1 IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ch. 1, at 13 (2d ed. 2010).
8
Kaplow, supra note 1, at 1823–28.
9
Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Antitrust Policy in an Age of IP Expansion 3 (Univ.
of Iowa Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 04-03, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=634224.
10
For alternative views on how to resolve the patent-antitrust conflict, see Pierre
Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, The Relationship Between Intellectual Property Law and
Competition Law: an Economic Approach, in THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COMPETITION POLICY 505 (Steven D. Anderman ed., 2007); Carrier,
supra note 5, at 799–800; Crane, supra note 5; Drexl, supra note 5.
11
SCOTCHMER, supra note 6, at 103–11.
12
This is especially true in the pharmaceutical context, where Congress must balance the
need to generate innovation incentives and the provision of affordable medicine to the
public. See SHAYERAH ILIAS & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL40607,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES: INTERNATIONAL TRADE ISSUES
7
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technical doctrinal or factual issues that can be decided without bringing in
policy considerations.13
Antitrust pays closer attention to dynamic efficiency considerations.
When deciding cases arising in technological sectors, antitrust courts are
mindful of the impact of its decisions on innovation incentives. An
example is Microsoft v. United States, in which the D.C. Circuit, despite the
weight of Supreme Court precedents, refused to apply the per se rule to
Microsoft’s tying of Internet Explorer to Windows. The rationale for the
refusal was that the “novel, purported efficiencies” of such an integration of
functionalities means that applying per se condemnation to such a tie
“might stunt valuable innovation.”14 Yet one may argue that antitrust has
not developed adequate analytical tools for evaluating innovation-based
claims as opposed to static efficiency claims, which remain the main
concern for antitrust. When antitrust courts are faced with countervailing
static and dynamic efficiencies, their response is usually to downplay the
conflict or subordinate one to the other without balancing.15 This is
illustrated by the D.C. Circuit’s assessment of the Section 2 claim against
Microsoft for creating a new Java Virtual Machine that was incompatible
with the existing one developed by Sun Microsystems. 16 The court was
unwilling to second-guess the veracity of Microsoft’s innovation even
though there was ample evidence that Microsoft had developed its own Java
Virtual Machine with the express goal to create confusion in the market and
to undermine Sun’s product.17 Purported dynamic efficiency gains trumped
proven static efficiency loss in the case.
Having seen that patent and antitrust laws are not in an irreconcilable
conflict, we are still left with a crucial question—how should the balance be
struck? The foregoing discussion suggests weighing static against dynamic
efficiencies. However, weighing of policy considerations is an inexact
exercise in which the outcome depends on the weight attached to the
individual factors. If innovations are to be pursued to the greatest extent
possible, even at the cost of substantial short-term consumer welfare losses,
dynamic efficiency considerations must reign supreme. Antitrust defers to
patent policy, and minimizes interference with patent exploitation and
licensing practices. If instead the emphasis is placed on protection of
consumer welfare, antitrust restrictions on a patentee’s freedom of action
2 (2009).
13
KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406–07 (2007); Roanwell Corp. v.
Plantronics, Inc., 429 U.S. 1004, 1006 (1976); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18
(1966); SCOTCHMER, supra note 6, at 107.
14
United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 90–92 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
15
Commentators have argued that it is in fact not unfeasible to attempt such balancing.
See Carrier, supra note 5, at 799–800.
16
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 55.
17
Id. at 77.
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will be more stringent.18
III. INCORPORATING DEVELOPMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS IN
THE PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERFACE
For developing countries tackling the patent-antitrust interface, what is
already a delicate balancing exercise takes on even greater complexity.
This is due to the fact that developing country antitrust authorities need to
look at a broader range of considerations than mere static and dynamic
efficiencies. This need is largely derived from the fact that these authorities
must take into account the impact of the interface on economic growth and
development, which is the paramount challenge facing developing
countries.
The fundamental premise of this Article is that the analytical approach
to antitrust issues needs to be tailored to the economic circumstances of a
particular country. Antitrust, being an area of economic regulation, must be
applied with sensitivity to the economic environment in which it operates.
The kind of adjustments called for here are not variations in enforcement
priorities, but changes in the substantive analytical framework that is
applied to specific antitrust issues. The need for adjustment is particularly
pressing for developing countries, whose economies differ so significantly
from industrialized nations that analytical approaches that have worked in
the latter could prove to be unsuitable for the former. And most analytical
tools in antitrust were developed with industrialized economies in mind.
This is not to say that every area of antitrust law needs to be altered to suit
developing countries. Cartel enforcement, for example, is unlikely to differ
significantly across jurisdictions. There is an unusual consensus within
antitrust circles that cartels are detrimental to consumers and society in
general and should be condemned in developed and developing countries
alike.19 There are areas of antitrust law, however, that are sensitive to the
particular economic circumstances of a country, and need to be adjusted
accordingly. The patent-antitrust interface is one of them.
There are a number of reasons that a different approach to the patentantitrust interface is needed for developing countries. First, and most
obviously, is that developing countries’ capacity to innovate differs from
that of industrialized economies. While generating adequate innovation
incentives is an important policy objective in developed countries,20
18

Income to poor developing country consumers is worth more because of diminishing
marginal utility of money. See Frederic M. Scherer, A Note on Global Welfare in
Pharmaceutical Patenting, 27 WORLD ECON. 1127, 1131–32 (2004).
19
Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi, Criminalising Cartels: Why Critical Studies?, in
CRIMINALISING CARTELS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT
4 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011).
20
For an overview of the range of innovation policy initiatives of the U.S. government,
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developing countries simply may not have the potential inventors to benefit
from patentee rewards. The need to provide innovation incentives is less
pressing in developing countries.
Developing countries, of course, cannot be treated as a monolith.
They range from newly industrialized nations, such as South Korea and
Taiwan, to the least-developed nations of sub-Saharan Africa.21 While the
majority of the least-developed nations do not possess significant
innovative capacity, the newly industrialized developing countries are
highly advanced in certain high-technology sectors. South Korea is a world
leader in consumer electronics; Taiwan a powerhouse in the production of
semiconductors; and Brazil a leading innovator of agricultural technology. 22
Even the least-developed nations may possess limited innovative capacity
in certain sectors. Therefore, sweeping generalizations must be avoided.
Yet, the fact remains that industrialized economies possess vastly superior
innovative capacity as compared to developing countries. This is
demonstrated by the fact that OECD countries accounted for 78% of the
research and development (R&D) expenditure globally in 2005 while
developing countries accounted for only about 23%.23 This figure would
drop to 14.8% if one excluded China, which, due to the size of its economy
and its unique economic circumstances, should be treated as sui generis,
and analyzed separately from the remaining developing countries.24

see David C. Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg, The U.S. National Innovation System, in
NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 29 (Richard R. Nelson ed.,
1993).
21
Sub-Saharan African countries include Uganda, Rwanda, Mali, Niger, to name but a
few. One may in fact argue that, given their high level of educational attainment, general
availability of high quality healthcare, and impressive manufacturing and innovative
capacities in technological sectors, such as semiconductors and consumer electronics, it is no
longer accurate to classify South Korea and Taiwan as developing countries.
22
Abby Schultz, How South Korea Became a Consumer Product Juggernaut, CNBC
(July
16,
2012,
2:39
PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/48041792/How_South_Korea_Became_a_Consumer_Product_Jugg
ernaut; DEP’T. OF INV. SERVS., TAIWAN MINISTRY OF ECON. AFFAIRS, SEMICONDUCTOR
INDUSTRY: ANALYSIS AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES 4 (2008),
available at
http://investtaiwan.nat.gov.tw/doc/industry/15Semiconductor_Industry_eng.pdf (noting that
the top two semiconductor manufacturers in the world are Taiwanese companies); Pedro A.
Arraes Pereira et al., The Development of Brazilian Agriculture: Future Technological
Challenges and Opportunities, AGRICULTURE & FOOD SECURITY 1, 2 (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://www.agricultureandfoodsecurity.com/content/pdf/2048-7010-1-4.pdf
(highlighting
Brazilian innovations in agricultural technology).
23
Jacques Gaillard, Measuring Research and Development in Developing Countries:
Main Characteristics and Implications for Frascati Manual, 15 SCI., TECHNOLOGY & SOC’Y,
77, 95–96 (2010).
24
China alone contributed 8.9% of the world’s R&D expenditure in 2007. UNESCO INST.
OF
STAT.,
GLOBAL
INVESTMENTS
IN
R&D
(2011),
available
at
http://www.uis.unesco.org/FactSheets/Documents/fs15_2011-investments-en.pdf.
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Second, as suggested earlier, developing countries need to focus on
economic growth and development. While development is an ongoing
process for every country, and no country can relax from the pursuit of
economic progress, developing countries face a much more urgent task of
improving the livelihood of their people. Given the importance of
technological progress in spurring economic growth25 and the potentially
significant impact of antitrust rules on patent exploitation on innovation and
technology transfer, developing countries need to tread carefully when
approaching patent-antitrust issues. If adopting a permissive attitude
toward patent exploitation practices will facilitate technology transfer to
such an extent that the consequent boost to the economy outweighs
consumer harm, a developing country will do well to give greater freedom
of action to patentees. If the economic benefits turn out to be less
substantial, a developing country should instead take a more pro-antitrust
stance.
Third, antitrust in developing countries cannot be exclusively
concerned with the pursuit of economic efficiency, because markets in
those countries are likely to behave differently from those in developed
countries. Markets are often less dynamic in developing countries and
potential market entrants are often less abundant. For example, in
developed countries, especially the United States, it is often argued that
predatory pricing should only be condemned if the monopolist has a
reasonable prospect for recouping its loss.26 If new entrants can easily enter
the market to undercut the supra-competitive price imposed by the
monopolist after it has successfully driven out existing rivals, consumers do
not suffer any harm.27 While this assumption may be valid in an
industrialized economy with dynamic markets like the United States, it is
less applicable in developing countries. In some developing countries,
entrepreneurship is so limited and new market entry so rare and difficult to
achieve that no new entrants may come by during the recoupment period.
This observation is corroborated by a report published by the International
Development Research Centre in Canada. Concerning adjustments in a
Peruvian market after trade liberalization, the report states:
While the elimination of inefficiency is economically a laudable
goal, the projected transfer of resources from less productive uses to
more productive uses did not occur due to a lack of capital and
entrepreneurship. Thus, rather than creating new jobs, trade
liberalization resulted in the destruction of many of the few jobs that

25

For a more detailed discussion of this point, see infra Part III.A.1.
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993)
(requiring reasonable prospect of recoupment as one element of predatory pricing claim).
27
Id. at 224.
26
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existed.28

Developing country antitrust authorities should avoid facile, or
sometimes heroic, assumptions about the competitive vitality of their
markets. This observation will be highly relevant to the patent-antitrust
interface in developing countries.
A. Definitions of Economic Growth and Development
Before exploring how the needs of economic growth and development
can be taken into account in the patent-antitrust interface in developing
countries, one needs to define these two terms. The two terms, in fact, have
distinct meanings and have been studied extensively by economists.
Economists have long been fascinated by the relationship between
technological progress and economic growth. In particular, a considerable
amount of economic research has been devoted to the question of the
contribution of technological progress to economic growth. This question
is of particular relevance to the patent-antitrust interface. To the extent that
an increased scope of patent exploitation increases patentee reward, which
promotes innovation, which in turn propels growth, the patent-antitrust
interface should be tilted in favor of patent policy. Conversely, if other
factors intervene in this causal chain and the relationship between scope of
patent exploitation and economic growth turns out to be more tenuous,
consumer welfare loss is more likely to outweigh dynamic efficiency gains.
In this scenario, antitrust restrictions on patent exploitation practices should
be tightened.
1. Economic Growth
Economic growth has been defined “as an historical process of
structural change in the broadest sense.”29 Despite this broad definition,
and partly due to the difficulty with measurement and quantification of
structural changes, economists have tended to use increase in per capita
income as an indication of economic growth. The economic study of
growth can be said to have begun with Nobel Laureate Robert Solow, who
published his seminal work on the topic in 1956.30 Following Solow’s
pioneering work in the area, economists attempted to explain the
relationship between technological progress and economic growth by way

28
STEWART ET AL., INT’L DEV. RESEARCH CTR., COMPETITION LAW IN ACTION:
EXPERIENCES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 20 (2007).
29
Bart Verspagen, Innovation and Economic Growth, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INNOVATION 486, 488 (Jan Fagerberg et al. eds., 2005).
30
Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 QUARTERLY
J. ECON. 65 (1956).
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of a concept known as total factor productivity (TFP).31 Economists
identify three sources of economic growth: growth in labor; growth in
capital, such as machinery; and TFP growth.32 Technological progress,
which affects TFP, is taken to be an exogenous variable.33 Using this
method, economists have concluded that more than half of the variation in
per capita income can be attributable to differences in TFP.34 Ever since
Solow’s work, there has been a general consensus among economists that
“research and development is a major source of economic growth . . . .
[M]ost studies show a high correlation between R&D expenditures and
productivity growth after accounting for investment in ordinary capital.”35
Solow’s model is not without problems, however. First, many
economists have been critical of the TFP concept because of difficulties
with conceptualization and measurement.36 Second, and more importantly,
the results of Solow’s model have not been borne out by actual data.
Solow’s model, which attributes growth to factor accumulation, predicts
declining growth rate over time.37 This is largely due to diminishing
marginal productivity of factors of production.38 But this prediction is
inconsistent with observed data.39 To reconcile the inconsistency between
theoretical predictions and real-world observations, “technological change
has to be rising over time, and rising fast enough to overcome the curtailing
effects of accumulation.”40 Subsequent economists, such as Paul Romer,
developed what has come to be known as endogenous growth models that
attempt to account for this accelerated technological change, which is
needed for long-term growth rates to be non-declining.41
Endogenous growth models, such as Romer’s, identify R&D
spillovers42 as a central cause for non-declining growth.43 R&D spillovers
31

Verspagen, supra note 29, at 490.
Id.
33
Id. at 489.
34
ELHANAN HELPMAN, THE MYSTERY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 34 (2004).
35
Richard Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the CompetitionInnovation Debate?, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 159, 159 (2006).
36
Verspagen, supra note 29, at 489–90. It has been said that using TFP to explain the
residual of growth accounting relies on a number of strong assumptions, which are likely to
be violated in practice. This means that the residual is likely to include many more factors
than simply the contribution of technology. Also, many of the factors incorporated in
growth accounting calculations “are interrelated by causal links not accounted for by the
underlying theory.” Id. at 490.
37
HELPMAN, supra note 34, at 35.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Paul Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J. POL. ECON. S71 (1990).
42
R&D spillovers can be understood as the externality of innovation. It refers to the fact
that a considerable portion of the benefits of an innovation are not appropriated by the
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eliminate the problem of diminishing returns to the aggregate knowledge of
an economy, which was a main culprit for declining growth in Solow’s
model. It is important to emphasize that R&D spillovers do not eliminate
diminishing returns to private knowledge—the technological knowledge
accumulated by one firm still exhibits diminishing returns.44 What it does
eliminate is diminishing returns to the aggregate knowledge of the
economy. What one firm learns from another firm’s innovation will
improve the productivity of the first firm’s R&D.45 In other words, there
are considerable externalities for R&D that keep technological knowledge
productive and economies growing at non-declining rates. Professor
Elhanan Helpman describes this process as follows:
In the model, innovators aim to invent new products, which provide
them with profits and thereby an incentive to innovate. But
inadvertently, they also create knowledge that is not embodied in
blueprints and cannot be retained as a trade secret.
This
“disembodied” knowledge becomes available to other innovators and
thereby reduces future R&D costs for everyone. Under these
circumstances, the stock of knowledge available to innovators is a
function of past R&D efforts. The more R&D was performed in the
past the larger this stock and the cheaper it is to do R&D today. . . .
This mechanism—of forward R&D spillovers—reduces R&D costs
over time.46

Economic research has confirmed the existence of R&D spillovers.47
The economic literature on growth is vast and complex and the
innovator itself but are shared by others. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE FREE MARKET
INNOVATION MACHINE: ANALYZING THE GROWTH MIRACLE OF CAPITALISM 5 (2002).
43
See Romer, supra note 41. at S89.
44
See HELPMAN, supra note 34, at 38.
45
For example, the success of a pharmaceutical research project is enhanced by the
success of related programs in other firms. William S. Comanor, The Economics of
Research and Development in the Pharmaceutical Industry, in PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 65 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh eds., 2007); Gilbert, supra note 35, at
202.
46
HELPMAN, supra note 34, at 44.
47
See, e.g., Jeffrey Bernstein & Ishaq Nadiri, Research and Development and Intraindustry Spillovers: An Empirical Implication of Dynamic Duality, 56 REV. ECON. STUD.
249, 249 (1989); Jeffrey Bernstein, The Structure of Canadian Inter-industry R&D
Spillovers, and the Rates of Return to R&D, 37 J. INDUS. ECON. 315 (1989); Timothy F.
Bresnahan, Measuring Spillovers from Technical Advance: Mainframe Computers in
Financial Services, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 742 (1986); Akira Goto & Kazuyuki Suzuki, R&D
Capital, Rate of Return on R&D Investment and Spillover of R&D in Japanese
Manufacturing Industries, 71 REV. ECON. & STAT. 555 (1989); Adam B. Jaffe,
Technological Opportunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms’ Patents, Profits,
and Market Value, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 984 (1986).
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foregoing merely attempts to provide a brief overview of essential concepts
for the purposes of this Article. This discussion yields a number of
important lessons for the patent-antitrust interface in developing countries.
First, it is clear that in order to promote economic growth, not only do
developing countries need to spur innovation and build domestic innovative
capacity, they should also adopt policies that facilitate R&D spillovers.
Helpman confines his discussion of spillover to disembodied or tacit
knowledge, sometimes also known as know-how, which generally refers to
non-patentable technical knowledge that is nonetheless essential for a firm
to implement an invention.48 This need not be the case, however, since
spillover applies to patented knowledge as well. Economists have observed
that knowledge spillover, including that of patented knowledge, takes place
by way of patent applications and trade shows.49 It is not uncommon for a
rival firm to learn about a new technology through patent applications and
utilize the technical knowledge contained in the applications to invent
around the patent. Moreover, and more importantly for the purposes of this
Article, antitrust law can facilitate R&D spillover by making it easier for
rivals to obtain and utilize patented knowledge. This can be accomplished
by restricting the scope of patent protection and exploitation.
The second important lesson for developing countries is the need to
adopt pro-active policies to promote technological progress and to pursue
growth. While Solow’s model suggests that countries will converge to a
common steady state growth rate, the endogenous growth models only
predict conditional convergence: “[T]his work leads to the conclusion that
steady state growth rates differ between nations. Growth rates may
converge toward a country-specific steady state growth path at best (socalled conditional convergence), leading to the divergence of growth paths
among countries.”50 In other words, developing countries cannot rely on
their supposedly higher returns to knowledge accumulation—because of
their start from a lower base—and convergence of growth rates to catch up
with developed countries. Instead, they need to pursue policies that actively
promote technological progress. Empirical studies have confirmed that the
48
Professor Keith Maskus illustrates the concept of tacit knowledge by positing that
“[g]aining access to blueprints of a complex technology is of little competitive advantage in
itself unless there is also a way to determine how to use it efficiently.” KEITH E. MASKUS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 136 (2000); see also Edwin
Mansfield, Mark Schwartz & Samuel Wagner, Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical
Study, 91 THE ECON. J. 907, 910 (1981) (showing that tacit knowledge allows a firm to
implement a complex technology from the blueprints and to use it efficiently); Frederic M.
Scherer, The Economics of the Patent System, in INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 439, 445 (Frederic M. Scherer ed., 1980).
49
Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development, 1987(3) BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 806–07 (1987).
50
Verspagen, supra note 29, at 506.
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conditions for catching up have become increasingly unfavorable over time,
and more innovative efforts are required of the technological laggards.51 To
the extent the patent-antitrust interface can influence technology transfer,
developing countries may wish to consider using antitrust law as a policy
tool to accelerate catching up.
2. Development
While economic growth generally refers to increase in per capita
income, the concept of development is considerably broader and more
multi-faceted. The academic literature on development is vast and varied.
Nonetheless, development literature can be roughly classified into two
schools of thought, which Professor Margaret Chon calls the Neoliberal
school and the Skeptical school.52
The main dividing line between these two schools is their respective
faith in the ability of free market policies to deliver development. The
Neoliberal school believes that development effort should focus on
achieving economic growth attained through a range of liberalizing policies,
such as dismantling of trade barriers, encouragement of FDI, simplification
of taxation system, removal of market-distorting government policies,
enhanced protection of property rights, liberalization of previously
regulated industries, paring down of the state-owned sector and divestiture
of state-owned enterprises, and improved protection of intellectual
property.53 Neoliberals believe that economic growth and efficiency are the
main focus of development. Distributive concerns are not given much
weight under the presumption that the wealth generated by pro-growth
liberal policies will eventually trickle down to the poor. On the intellectual
property front, the TRIPS Agreement is the culmination of this Neoliberal
view of development.54 The implicit rationale behind requiring developing
countries to heighten intellectual property protection is that these countries
will only develop innovative capacity by protecting domestic innovators
from free-riding. As Chon notes, “Integrating intellectual property
standards through TRIPS is supposed to result in long term economic
growth through innovation across all member states, at the cost of short
term decreases in access to goods because of higher prices.”55

51
See Jan Fagerberg & Bart Verspagen, Technology-gaps, Innovation Diffusion and
Transformation: an Evolutionary Interpretation, 31 RES. POL’Y. 1291, 1302 (2002) (using,
as technological laggards, countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and
Turkey).
52
Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2821, 2853–63 (2005–2006).
53
Id. at 2863.
54
Id. at 2864.
55
Id. at 2866.
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The Skeptical approaches to development focus on “historicallydriven, path-dependent, structural impediments to development.”56 Some
proponents of these approaches believe that obstacles to development are
legacies of colonization.57 Others attribute slowed growth to pathdependency and economic determinism.58 Some present feminist critiques
of the discourse on development.59 What all Skeptics share is a common
opposition to the Neoliberal vision for development, especially its emphasis
on growth and market liberalization as a panacea for the woes of developing
countries. To them, development must mean not only higher economic
growth, but also inclusive growth that benefits different socio-economic
classes. Development must permit the satisfaction of basic human needs,
such as education and health care. Only with satisfaction of these basic
needs can individuals fulfill their full potential. This broader vision of
development is best encapsulated by Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen:
The ends and means of development require examination and
scrutiny for a fuller understanding of the development process; it is
simply not adequate to take as our basic objective just the
maximization of income or wealth, which is, as Aristotle noted,
“merely useful and for the sake of something else.” For the same
reason, economic growth cannot sensibly be treated as an end in
itself. Development has to be more concerned with enhancing the
lives we lead and the freedoms we enjoy.60

In short, development needs to be more broadly conceptualized than a
singular focus on economic growth. At the very least, economic growth
must be accompanied by a somewhat equitable distribution of income.
Development policies must not wait idly by while the increased wealth
trickles down the social ladder. Moreover, development policies must
endeavor to improve access to basic services. With respect to patent
protection, one can easily imagine the Skeptics’ distrust of the TRIPS
Agreement. They question the merits of imposing heightened patent
protection requirements on developing countries.61
The Skeptics’ view has found an unlikely supporter. Although not a
development scholar, economist Professor William Baumol has opined on
the importance of the distribution of the benefits of innovation to economic
56

Id. at 2868.
Tayyab Mahmud, Postcolonial Imaginaries, Alternative Development or Alternatives
to Development?, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 26 (1999).
58
See generally RICHARD PEET & ELAINE HARTWICK, THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT 14
(1999).
59
SHAWN MEGHAN BURN, WOMEN ACROSS CULTURES: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 133–57
(2000).
60
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 14 (1999).
61
Chon, supra note 52, at 2867.
57
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growth and development.62 He forcefully argues that society is better off if
the benefits of innovation are not reserved to the originator of the
innovation, but spread broadly among members of society.63 This is so
even if the spillover of benefits beyond the innovator slightly reduces
innovation incentives:
The reason a zero spillover level is not optimal is that, though
spillovers are a disincentive for investment in innovation (as most of
the literature contend), they are at the same time significant benefits
in themselves. A major component of these spillovers is the resulting
(spectacular) increase in economic welfare of the population as a
whole, so that innovation does not just benefit direct participants in
the innovation process. Indeed, these spillovers, in the form of
resulting rises in general living standards, are arguably the prime
social benefits of innovation.64

Spillovers from innovation boost the well-being of the general public
by improving access to healthcare and education, which in turn gives
society a more productive and educated workforce. Baumol notes that if
spillovers from innovation were successfully kept at zero, “the living
standards of the vast majority of the citizens of today’s rich countries would
have stalled at pre-Industrial Revolution levels.”65 He proceeds to conclude
that low or even zero spillovers, which can be achieved by expanding
intellectual property rights and stepping up enforcement, are far from
socially optimal. Innovation incentives need to be sacrificed to obtain these
distributive social benefits, even at the expense of higher absolute growth.66
In fact, Baumol questions whether permitting substantial spillovers will
necessarily undermine innovation. He refers to Japan, where patent
protection is considerably weaker than the United States, as an example of a
country where spillovers are probably substantial, but innovations
nonetheless abundant.67 The relatively weaker patent protection available
in Japan may have spurred Japanese firms to enter into technology-sharing
arrangements, which have in turn allowed for the rapid dissemination of
innovations, and for growth in productivity.
This willingness to sacrifice innovation incentives is all the more
remarkable given that Baumol is an innovation economist. His view further
buttresses the Skeptics’ position that a development strategy focusing solely
or predominantly on wealth creation and economic efficiency is likely to be
62
63
64
65
66
67

BAUMOL, supra note 42, at 121.
Id.
Id. (italics added).
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id. at 141.
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deficient. Development strategy generally, and its application to the patentantitrust interface in particular, must account for the distributive
consequences of government policy.
B. A Summary of Developmental Considerations
Reconciling these two schools of development thinking is beyond the
scope of this Article. A number of useful insights, however, can be gleaned
to guide our exploration of the patent-antitrust interface in developing
countries. First, both schools agree that economic growth is an important
component of development. The Skeptics challenge the Neoliberal view
that economic growth is the be-all-end-all of development. Nonetheless, no
viable development policies can afford to overlook economic growth. The
first and foremost issue in this Article is a possible role for the patentantitrust interface in promoting technological progress, and hence,
economic growth. This is consistent with the earlier discussion of
economic analysis of growth by Solow and Romer.
Second, after the demise of the Washington Consensus, it is
increasingly questioned whether a singular focus on economic growth to the
neglect of income distribution and the satisfaction of basic human needs is a
sound development policy.68 Inclusive growth that pays at least some
attention to how the newly generated wealth is distributed is highly
important. The welfare benefits of such inclusive growth have been noted
by Baumol.69 Antitrust law is certainly not in the business of redistributing
income, nor is it an appropriate mechanism for rationing access to basic
services, but it can at least pay some heed to how its doctrines affect the
poor, who are more likely to be consumers than producers. Consumer
welfare loss by the poor should be minimized because of the diminishing
marginal utility of money. The loss of every dollar bites at low levels of
income. In particular, in resolving the patent-antitrust conflict, a greater
regard for the poor means that monopoly loss should not be lightly imposed
on consumers in order to encourage innovation. The extra money that
developing country consumers need to spend to generate patentee reward is
a much more precious resource to them. This is especially so if the
patented product at issue is a basic necessity, the demand for which is
inelastic.
Third, the patent-antitrust interface should take into account, to the
extent possible, access to basic services. The most notable example is
medicine. The TRIPS Agreement already contains mechanisms for
developing countries to order compulsory licensing of patented medicine in

68
69
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times of a public health emergency.70 In cases involving medicine,
foodstuffs, and other necessities, consumer interest in obtaining them at
lower prices, the denial of which may result in hunger and malnutrition,
should be accorded greater weight.
Fourth, inclusive growth also means encouraging indigenous
entrepreneurship. One way to alleviate economic inequality in developing
countries is to ensure that business opportunities are open to the poor. The
poor’s participation in the market is likely to be through small- and
medium-sized businesses.71 Without causing undue interference with the
market and sacrifice of economic efficiency, some weight should be given
to the interests of these enterprises when resolving the patent-antitrust
conflict.
To sum up, while industrialized economies may only focus on the
tradeoff between consumer welfare and innovation incentives when tackling
the patent-antitrust interface, developing countries must consider a broader
range of issues: (1) how technological progress affects their growth
prospects and conditions for catching up; (2) how consumer welfare loss is
distributed within their societies; (3) how the patent-antitrust interface
affects access to basic necessities; and (4) how a more pro-antitrust stance
may facilitate or impede technology transfer, both authorized and
unauthorized, especially to small- and medium-sized enterprises.
Before attempting to incorporate these considerations into the patentantitrust interface, one must revert to a crucial issue that has been alluded to
a few times in this Article—the extent to which patent protection spurs
innovation. This is an issue that warrants close scrutiny by developing
countries. If the causal link between patentee reward and innovation is
weak, there is a strong argument for developing countries to shift the
balance in favor of antitrust policy. On the contrary, if the link is strong,
developing countries that have innovative capacity should approach the
patent-antitrust interface cautiously and avoid undue restrictions of patent
exploitation practices. This issue is explored in the next Part.
IV. INNOVATION INCENTIVES AND THE PATENT-ANTITRUST
INTERFACE
As far as innovation incentives in developing countries are concerned,
one must distinguish domestic innovation from global or external
innovation. In today’s globalized world, the innovation incentives
generated by a patent system extend beyond domestic borders and may
affect foreign firms. The extent to which a shift in the patent-antitrust
70

CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 89–94 (2000).
71
ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL RETHINKING OF
THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL POVERTY 205–24 (2011).
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interface in developing countries affects innovation by developed country
firms is an interesting issue examined infra Part IV.D.
The central issue in this Part is whether tighter antitrust restrictions on
patent exploitation will undermine domestic innovation in developing
countries. The relevance of this issue hinges on the existence of domestic
innovative capacity in a certain sector. If there is no innovative capacity in
a particular industry, the innovation incentives generated by the patent
system will redound no benefit to the domestic economy. One may retort
that even if innovative capacity is currently absent, patent protection may
attract potential innovators. While there is some validity to this argument,
for certain technology-intensive sectors, there is simply no hope for some
developing countries to develop any innovative capacity in the foreseeable
future.72 There is no reason to incur valuable consumer welfare loss to
generate or maintain innovation incentives in these sectors. Therefore, if a
developing country currently possesses no innovative capacity in a certain
sector, and has no prospect of doing so in the near future, maintenance of
innovation incentives should be a low priority. The issue is different for
developing countries that possess innovative capacity in particular sectors.
For these countries, the extent to which tighter antitrust restrictions on
patent exploitation will undermine innovation incentives is a matter of
grave concern. It is this topic to which the ensuing discussion will turn.
The general belief is that patent protection is needed to generate
innovation incentives, and that society would be worse off with reduced
patent protection due to a loss of innovation.73 As it turns out, there is a
considerable amount of both theoretical and empirical economic literature
that cast doubt on these beliefs. The extent to which patent protection is
needed to secure innovations varies across industries. While patent
protection is important for some industries, such as pharmaceuticals and
chemicals,74 it plays a much more attenuated role in attracting innovative
efforts in others. This insight will have important implications for the
patent-antitrust interface in developing countries.

72

CORREA, supra note 70, at 140. Correa argues that introducing patent protection for
pharmaceuticals will not spur domestic R&D in pharmaceuticals in developing countries,
because “the development of new chemical entities is outside the reach of local companies in
any developing country, since there are no firms in such countries big enough (in terms of
total sales) to finance the high costs of pharmaceutical R&D.” Id. at 43. He further argues
that “[t]he high investment required for mass chip production and the intensity and cost of
R&D in an extremely competitive market constitute formidable barriers for potential new
entrants, particularly those from developing countries.” Id. at 140.
73
See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2004).
74
See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 212–
42 (2008) (challenging the view that patent protection is important in pharmaceutical and
chemical industries).
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A. Some Definitions
Before turning to the relevant literature, it is important to first define a
number of key terms. These terms are key to understanding the entire
debate about whether patent protection is necessary to spur innovation.
1. Invention vs. Innovation
Invention and innovation have been used somewhat interchangeably
thus far in this Article. Economists have in fact used them to refer to
different things. According to some economists, “Invention refers to the
creation of new knowledge, and innovation (or commercialization) refers to
the development of marketable products from that knowledge.”75
Innovation, hence, includes “design, production, marketing and the rest of
the myriad activities that contribute to the making of things.”76 While
invention and innovation usually go hand in hand, Austrian economist
Joseph Schumpeter notes that “[i]nnovation is possible without anything we
should identify as invention, and invention does not necessarily induce
innovation, but produces of itself . . . no economically relevant effect at
all.”77 Because innovation encompasses invention and much more, the
costs of innovation substantially exceed invention costs.78
Economists have long debated whether the patent system should only
provide incentives to invent, or whether patentee reward should also cover
innovation costs.79 This is important because invention does not necessarily
lead to innovation and commercialization. Society as a whole must decide
whether innovation is itself a sufficiently valuable activity that needs to be
encouraged through policy intervention. While some have argued that the
patent system should only be concerned with inventions,80 the consensus in
recent literature seems to be that innovation costs should be taken into
account by the patent system.81 This Article makes no attempt to settle this
75
Keith E. Maskus et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development in
China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC
RESEARCH 295, 299 (Carsten Fink & Keith M. Maskus eds., 2005) (emphasis in original).
76
Stuart Macdonald, Exploring the Hidden Costs of Patents, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 13, 23 (Peter Drahos & Ruth
Mayne eds., 2002).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 23 (“It is important to remember that of the total resources required for
innovation, only a small proportion comes from invention; the majority comes from design,
production, marketing and the rest of the myriad of activities that contribute to the making of
things.”).
79
See Scherer, supra note 48, at 441.
80
See Macdonald, supra note 76, at 24.
81
See generally ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT
TO DO ABOUT IT 43 (2004); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
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debate, and assumes for the purpose of discussion that the patent system
should aim to compensate both invention and innovation costs. With this
assumption established, invention and innovation will continue to be used
interchangeably in this Article. Their more precise usage will be employed
where necessary.
Some commentators have posited that the definition of innovation may
be context-specific. Keith Maskus observes that “[d]efining innovation is
extremely difficult in the context of a developing country. Many forms of
adaptation, absorption, and even creative imitation can be legitimate
manifestations of innovation.”82 In other words, there is no global standard
of inventiveness. What counts as an innovation depends on the existing
state of technological development of the country. A new method for
producing a chemical may not be novel in a global sense, but it may be the
first such implementation in a developing country. In that case, this
adaptation of the production method should qualify as an innovation in that
country.
Maskus’s observation also hints at a very important point that has been
made by other commentators: adaptation may require sophisticated
technological knowledge and technical know-how.83 Imitation is costly, in
some cases even more so than the original inventive process.84 Even though
imitation may be ridiculed by intellectual property advocates as piracy to be
deterred at all costs, it is in fact a very important means for developing
countries to acquire technological capacity. For example, in the nineteenth
century, the United States was known for its extensive copying of foreignpatented technology, which allowed it to catch up with the global
technological leader of the time, Great Britain.85 One may choose to call it
innovation or imitation, the fact remains that such activity is crucial for
developing countries to acquire technological capacity and catch up with
industrialized economies. The patent-antitrust interface has significant
impact on imitation. To the extent that facilitation of imitation will allow a
developing country to acquire technological capacity, thereby accelerating

Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 703 (2001) (proposing a
commercialization view of patent systems and emphasizing the importance of patent systems
in providing incentives to commercialize invention); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (arguing that the main function of
a patent system is to facilitate commercialization of inventions).
82
Maskus et al., supra note 75, at 325.
83
Mansfield et al., supra note 48, at 910.
84
See id. at 909–10; Levin et al., supra note 49, at 807–12 (showing that for one-seventh
of the innovations surveyed in their study, imitation costs were no smaller than the
development costs by the original inventor).
85
See generally Ove Granstrand, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION, supra note 29, at 266, 284; Scherer, supra note 18, at
1140.
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economic growth, antitrust law should facilitate it.
2. Incentive to Innovate
Another important term to define is the incentive to innovate, which
has been used repeatedly in this Article. Professor Richard Gilbert defines
the incentive to innovate as “the difference in profit that a firm can earn if it
invests in research and development compared to what it would earn if it
did not invest.”86 This incentive is determined by a number of factors,
including “the characteristics of the invention, the strength of intellectual
property protection, the extent of competition before and after innovation,
barriers to entry in production and R&D, and the dynamics of R&D.”87
3. Technological Regime
The last set of terms to be defined describes the conditions of a
particular industry that determine the importance of patent protection to
innovation. The first concept to be introduced is known as a technological
regime, which refers to the general technological environment of an
industry as it pertains to innovation. In particular, a technological regime
can be broken down into two components: technological opportunity and
appropriability conditions.88 Technological opportunities “reflect the
likelihood of innovating for any given amount of money invested in
(re)search.”89 They refer to the ease with which innovations can be found
in a particular industry, or the potential for innovation. Professor F.M.
Scherer, one of the leading experts on innovation, further elucidates the
concept as follows: “Technological opportunity in this context could relate
partly to industry traditions or to demand conditions not manifested in mere
sales volume, but it seems most likely to be associated with dynamic supply
conditions dependent in turn upon the broad advance of scientific and
technological knowledge.”90 Industries with close ties to traditional, basic
scientific research, such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, are replete with
technological opportunities.91 Other industries, such as paper, food
products, textile, and clothing, have fewer technological opportunities.92
The abundance of technological opportunities in a particular industry is
exogenous to patent policy and the patent-antitrust interface. It is
86

Gilbert, supra note 35, at 159.
Id. at 162.
88
Franco Malerba, Sectoral Systems: How and Why Innovation Differs Across Sectors,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION, supra note 29, at 380, 382.
89
Id.
90
Frederic M. Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of
Patented Inventions, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 1097, 1100 (1965).
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Malerba, supra note 88, at 382.
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determined by the nature of the industry and the technologies it employs.
The patent-antitrust interface thus takes this dimension of a technological
regime as given.
Appropriability refers to the conditions of an industry that allow the
inventor to reap the economic benefits of its invention and to recoup its
investment in it.
Appropriability “summarizes the possibilities of
protecting innovations from imitation and of reaping profits from
innovative activities. High appropriability means the existence of ways of
successfully protecting innovation from imitation. Low appropriability
conditions denote an economic environment characterized by widespread
existence of externalities.”93 Appropriability is high when imitation is
technically difficult (as in the case of complex machinery), costly, or when
effective mechanisms are available to the patentee to prevent or minimize
imitation. Otherwise, appropriability is likely to be low and the inventor
will face considerable difficulty in reaping the benefits of its invention.
Appropriability also depends on the accessibility and cumulativeness of
knowledge.94 If knowledge within the industry is easily accessible,
appropriability is likely to be low. If knowledge is cumulative, competitors
may have difficulty in replicating the inventor’s technology without access
to its knowledge base. Appropriability is thus likely to be high. Unlike
technological opportunities, appropriability is endogenous to the patent
system and the patent-antitrust interface. Changes in patent law and
antitrust restrictions of patent exploitation affect an inventor’s ability to
reap rewards from its invention.
The concept of cumulativeness of knowledge refers to the fact that
“today’s innovations and innovative activities form the starting point for
tomorrow’s innovations.
More broadly, one may say that high
cumulativeness means that today’s innovative firms are more likely to
innovate in the future in specific technologies and along specific trajectories
than non-innovative firms.”95 Cumulativeness highlights the fact that
technological development does not start on a blank page. Every invention
builds on prior knowledge or ideas.96 Cumulativeness does not only apply

93

Id.
Id. at 388–89.
95
Id. at 382.
96
This is illustrated by the steam engine. James Watt is generally credited for inventing
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to firms, but also at the country level.97 Today’s innovative nations are
more likely than the technological laggards to continue to innovate. The
result is path dependency in innovation for developing countries. Absent
dramatic changes, developing countries are likely to remain on the lowtechnology path of development.
There are many reasons for this. An important one, at least as it
pertains to the character of knowledge, is the relative lack of access to tacit
knowledge for developing countries. Tacit knowledge, or technical knowhow, tends to diffuse through more informal means. However, tacit
knowledge is crucial to a firm’s ability to utilize a new technology.98
Because of the informal means by which it is transferred, tacit knowledge
tends to circulate more freely within a domestic market than across national
borders, even though barriers to transnational flow are eroding with
globalization and advancement in communication technology.99 As such,
even if developing country firms have access to a patented technology from
foreign patent documents, their limited access to tacit knowledge
substantially impairs their ability to implement it. This brief discussion
highlights the enormous obstacles facing developing countries in their effort
to acquire technological capacity and catch up with industrialized
economies.
B. Is Patent Protection Necessary for Securing Innovation?
The basic economic rationale for patents is simple: “If there were no
incentives for those who discover and develop new technology, it is likely
that fewer innovations would be developed, slowing progress and the
benefits it brings.”100 Innovation incentives are likely to be under-supplied
because technology, embodied in the form of knowledge, possesses many
characteristics of a public good.101 The consumption of technological
knowledge is non-rivalrous, that is, one user’s consumption does not
exclude others. Moreover, technological knowledge is costly to produce
but easy to imitate. This means that without some form of legal
intervention, there will be an insufficient supply of technology. This is
97
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where patents come in. Patents improve the appropriability of technology
by allowing an inventor to exclude others from replicating, implementing,
or commercializing the technology. Patents are said to serve three
objectives: promote inventions, spur the development and commercial
utilization of inventions, and encourage inventors to disclose their
inventions to the public.102 Discussions about the objectives of patent
systems tend to focus on the first two; it is often easy to overlook the
third.103 This objective is important because in the implicit bargain between
the patent system and inventors is the grant of limited exclusivity in
exchange for the disclosure of knowledge that will benefit society.
Moreover, as discussed earlier, patent disclosure plays a role in the
dissemination of technical knowledge and R&D spillovers.
One striking feature of the discourse about the patent system is the
incongruity between the general perception about the system and academic
opinions among economists. While it is almost an article of faith within
antitrust circles that patent protection is needed to secure innovations,
economists have long expressed considerable reservations about, if not
outright hostility toward, patents.104 Professor Fritz Machlup, a pioneer in
innovation economics, famously opined:
If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the
basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to
recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system
for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.105

This observation was made in 1958. Despite half a century of further
research, this skepticism about the patent system has not been dispelled.
Sharing this ambivalent attitude, Scherer asserts: “It is almost
impossible to conceive of any existing social institutions so faulty in many
ways. It survives only because there seems to be nothing better.”106 He
believes the strongest justification for the patent system is to secure the kind
of rare, groundbreaking inventions that redound a disproportionately great
amount of benefits to society.107 An example is the photocopying
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technology invented by physicist Chester Carlson and commercialized by
The Haloid Corporation, which was subsequently renamed Xerox.108
Xerography, as the technology is officially known, is generally regarded as
a technology that would not have been successfully commercialized without
patent protection.109 Professor Sol Piciotto similarly notes that economists
“have therefore always had difficulty finding adequate justification for
these exclusive rights.”110 Even more critically, Professors Michele Boldrin
and David Levine have recently argued that intellectual property, including
patents, is better called intellectual monopoly and should be abolished.111
They assert that the patent system creates vastly more harm than good for
society.112
What follows is an overview of the theoretical arguments and
empirical evidence that shows how the case for the necessity of patent
protection to spur innovation has been overstated. From a theoretical
perspective, whether patent protection is necessary to reward inventors
depends on the appropriability conditions of the industry at issue, i.e.,
whether there are other means that allow the inventor to reap the benefits of
its invention without resorting to patent protection. As it turns out,
economists have shown through empirical studies that inventors in many
industries do not rely on patent protection as their primary means of
investment recoupment. There is evidence from both developed and
developing countries that support this conclusion.
1. Theoretical Analysis of the Need for Patent Protection to Spur
Innovation
Patent protection is not always necessary for securing innovation.
Conditions in an industry may be such that financial rewards are sufficient
absent patent protections to incentivize innovation. The abundance of
accessible technological opportunities lowers innovation costs, the
consequence of which is that firms may pursue innovation without the
financial reward provided by the patent system.113 This abundance may be
108
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109
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110
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attributted to the wealth of basic scientific research funded by the public
bodies or the nature of the industry. Similarly, if innovations can be
discovered relatively easily in the normal production process—this is
particularly relevant for process innovations—firms are again unlikely to
require innovation incentives supplied by the patent system.
Second, and more importantly, appropriability may be naturally high
in a particular industry due to its competitive structure or the nature of the
technology. Appropriability crucially depends on the likelihood of
imitation. If no imitation comes into the market after a new product is
invented and commercialized, the inventor’s chance of successful
recoupment of their investment is maximized.114 If imitation will happen
eventually, which is the case for most inventions, the key to appropriability
is the length of the imitation lag.115
From a potential imitator’s perspective, the decision to imitate or not
comes down to whether the profit from imitation outweighs its costs. The
two key determinants are hence the profit potential of imitation and
imitation costs.116 The profit from imitation depends on a variety of factors,
such as the profit potential (quasi-rent) of the invention and the number of
potential imitators. The profit potential of an invention in turn depends on
the demand for the product incorporating the technology. This is where the
nature of the technology comes into play. An invention that is unique or a
significant improvement of existing technology will likely attract strong
demand and generate significant profit potential. The profit potential for a
minor improvement of an existing technology is likely to be smaller. The
number of potential imitators also bears on the profit potential of imitation.
The existence of a large number of potential imitators means that they will
likely drive down the price of the imitated product, perhaps to even as low
as marginal costs. Profit potential also depends on the inventor’s pricing
strategy. An inventor that charges a high price will reap greater profit, but
will also attract market entrants sooner and in greater numbers. In sum,
other things being equal, the higher the profit potential for an invention, the
more likely it is that it will be imitated, and the lower the invention’s
appropriability.117
typically opened up by the broad advance of knowledge—are a major factor responsible for
interindustry differences in inventive output.”).
114
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Imitation costs mainly depend on two factors: the ease of imitation and
the amount of investments required to undertake the imitation, which is
driven by the first factor.118 Other things being equal, the more difficult it is
to imitate a technology, the more costly the imitation process. Ease of
imitation in turns depends on a variety of factors. Economists speak of the
codifiability of a technology, which refers to the extent to which a
technology can be accurately and comprehensively reduced to written
form.119 A technology that is easily codified, which characterizes most
inventions in the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors, is more easily
imitated.120 A potential imitator merely needs to pick up a blueprint or a
patent application to replicate the technology. Codifiability is related to
tacit knowledge. An invention that requires substantial tacit knowledge to
be implemented suffers from low codifiability and is difficult to imitate.121
Tacit knowledge is by definition not readily codifiable. Ease of imitation
lowers imitation costs and appropriability.
Imitation costs also depend on the complexity of the technology and
the number of related investments—such as construction of production
facilities and personnel training—that a firm must make to replicate the
technology.122 A firm may be able to reproduce an imitated technology in
its existing manufacturing facility. In that case, imitation costs are likely to
be low. Some new technology requires a reconfiguration of the existing
manufacturing facility or even the construction of a new plant. The
semiconductor industry is a prime example of this.123 It is not uncommon
for a new generation of semiconductor chips to require brand new
foundries.124 Imitation costs in such an industry are likely to be high. Even
if a competitor manages to get a hold of the latest design blueprint for an
Intel chip, it may still need to expend substantial resources to convert its
manufacturing facility for the new product.
Imitation is not the only determinant of appropriability.
Appropriability also depends on the profitability of the invention prior to or
entrepreneurs will choose to plunge.” Scherer, supra note 48, at 448. He proceeds to ask
whether “society [would] really lose much at the margin if, by abolishing the patent system,
it sacrifices mainly innovations with low benefit/cost ratios?” Id. The answer, according to
him, is likely to be negative. Id.
118
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119
Granstrand, supra note 85, at 282.
120
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in spite of imitation.125 High profit potential of an invention can be both a
curse and a blessing as far as appropriability is concerned. As mentioned
previously, high profit margin attracts imitators, which will undercut the
inventor’s profit. High profit margin is also what usually attracts the
inventor to invest in the invention in the first place. Profit potential varies
with the competitive structure of an industry. A perfectly competitive
market will require patent protection or some other kind of incentive
mechanism to secure innovations, as the price of the product will be driven
by competition to its marginal cost.126 In contrast, a market that is
oligopolistic or otherwise protected by substantial barriers to entry will
allow the firms to make use of their market power to charge supracompetitive prices, thereby recouping their investments.127 An oligopolistic
market will also have fewer potential imitators, which helps to preserve the
inventor’s profit.128
Appropriability is preserved if an inventor can recoup its investment
before imitated products come into the market. The pertinent issue is the
time it takes for successful imitation to take place—referred to as imitation
lag.129 Even if a technology can be effectively imitated, it often entails
substantial time lag. Secrecy, imperfect information about the technology,
and the amount of tacit knowledge associated with the deployment of the
technology all contribute to it.130 Imitation lag is important, because it
gives the inventor time to reap the benefits of its invention before its supracompetitive profit is competed away by imitation. This is known as the
first-mover advantage in the literature, and has been found to be an
important, if not the overriding, source of innovation incentives in some
industries.131 The first-mover advantage can be further augmented by brand
loyalty, which allows an inventor to continue to charge a supra-competitive
price after entry of imitated products.132
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that patent protection
is only needed to spur innovation if technological opportunities are sparse
and appropriability is low in a particular industry. In particular,
appropriability will be low if the technology at issue is easy to imitate,
125
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costly to develop, takes a short time to imitate, requires little tacit
knowledge or few other substantial investments to implement, and is not
particularly unique or economically valuable.133 Appropriability will also
be low if the market at issue is competitive and full of potential imitators,
has low barriers to entry, and is characterized by low brand loyalty, which
will undermine first-mover advantage. On the relationship between market
structure and innovation incentives, Professor Gilbert notes that
“[e]xclusive rights generally lead to greater innovation incentives in more
competitive markets, while nonexclusive rights generally lead to the
opposite conclusion, although there are important exceptions.”134 Patent
protection is hence less vital to innovation in less competitive industries.
Where appropriabilty is low, legal intervention, in the form of patent
protection or otherwise, may be needed to augment returns to technological
investment. However, where appropriability is already high in a particular
industry, patent protection is much less essential. If inventions in that
industry will continue to be made even without patent protection, a patent
system redounds few benefits to society while inflicting substantial costs in
the form of consumer welfare loss.
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals are industries that are marked by low
appropriability. Studies have repeatedly shown that these two industries
stand out in their reliance on patent protection to spur innovation.135 This is
hardly surprising given the fact that technology in both industries tends to
be relatively codifiable, does not require substantial tacit knowledge to
implement, is easy to imitate, and requires high R&D investment.136 This
means that both imitation costs and time lag are low. The profit potential,
however, is substantial for most chemical and pharmaceutical inventions,
especially the latter, because demand for medications tends to be inelastic
and market structure for the industry highly concentrated.137 This means
that imitation is highly profitable. It is this somewhat unusual alignment of
circumstances that renders both industries so dependent on patent protection
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for innovation.138 What is unfortunate is that these two industries,
especially the pharmaceutical industry, have often been held out as the
paradigm for innovation and used to justify patent protection. The fact of
the matter is that they are the exceptions rather than the rule.139 As the
ensuing discussion of the empirical literature will show, these two
industries are outliers in terms of their dependence on patent protection.
For most other industries, patent protection is much less important.
What is doubly unfortunate is that the pharmaceutical industry, in
particular, has hijacked patent policy both in the United States and globally.
It has been relentless in its drive for expansion of patent protection in the
United States, and was instrumental in the ultimate success of the TRIPS
Agreement, which enlarged patent rights at the expense of developing
country consumers.140 By some accounts, the push to incorporate
intellectual property issues on the then-GATT agenda came in no small part
from the pharmaceutical industry.141 It put enormous pressure on the U.S.
government to force India and Brazil to abandon its opposition to
pharmaceutical patents, which neither country had granted prior to
TRIPS.142 It even strenuously lobbied for a prohibition of parallel trade in
the Agreement.143 In the late-1990s, it lobbied the U.S. government to force
the South African government, under the threat of trade sanctions, to drop a
proposed law that would allow compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals,
despite the fact that the proposal fell clearly within the scope of the TRIPS
Agreement.144
Further exploration of the role of the pharmaceutical industry in the
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global expansion of patent rights is beyond the scope of this Article.145 The
fact remains, however, that in light of the foregoing discussion, developing
country antitrust authorities should have reservations about claims of
essentiality of patent protection for innovation and be ready to examine the
technological regime, and in particular the appropriability conditions, of the
underlying industry to verify those claims.
2. Empirical Evidence on the Need for Patent Protection to Spur
Innovation
Economics is replete with empirical studies indicating the industry
variation of the importance of patent protection to innovation. The first
systematic study of this issue was conducted in the United Kingdom. Using
data from twenty-seven firms, Professors Taylor and Silberston found that
64% of pharmaceutical R&D, 17% of chemical R&D, 5% of mechanical
engineering R&D, and a negligible amount of electrical engineering R&D
were dependent on patent protection.146 This result was subsequently
confirmed by a number of major studies on the relationship between patent
protection and innovation. In 1981, Professor Edwin Mansfield and his coauthors published the results of a study of the imitation time and costs in
chemical, drug, electronics, and machinery industries for forty-eight
product innovations.147 They found that 36% of the R&D expenditure by
the surveyed firms would not have been made without patent protection.148
Furthermore, innovating firms report that about 50% of the innovations in
the sample would not have been introduced absent patent protection, with
the bulk belonging to the pharmaceutical industry.149 Leaving out
innovations from that industry, the corresponding proportion falls to less
than one-quarter.150 All in all, they found that 90% of pharmaceutical
innovations and about 20% of chemical, electronics, and machinery
innovations are dependent on patent protection.151
Mansfield subsequently conducted another survey with an expanded
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scope, covering one hundred firms in twelve industries.152 The survey
produced results largely consistent with his 1981 study. He found that
patent protection was only deemed to be important for the development and
commercialization of over 30% of the innovations in the pharmaceutical
and chemical industries, and for 10% to 20% of the innovations in
petroleum, machinery, and fabricated metal products.153 Patent protection
was of limited value in electrical equipment, office equipment, motor
vehicles, instruments, primary metals, rubber, and textiles.154 These survey
results led Mansfield to conclude that “[d]espite the fact that the patent
system generally is defended at least partly on the grounds that it increases
the rate of innovation, the present study indicates that its effects in this
regard are very small in most of the industries we studied.”155
In one of the most authoritative studies on the topic, Levin and his
colleagues at Yale conducted an extensive study of the appropriability
conditions in more than one hundred manufacturing industries. This
survey, which consisted of a survey of high-level R&D executives, has
sometimes been referred to as the “Yale survey.”156 Levin and his
colleagues reached a number of important conclusions. First, they
concluded that the importance of patent protection varies with the type of
innovation at issue. Patent protection was found to have a more significant
effect on the appropriability conditions for product innovations than those
for process innovations.157 For process innovations, patents were generally
rated as the least effective appropriabilty mechanism.158 Lead time,
learning curve advantages, and secrecy were all reported to be more
effective.159 For product innovations, patents were more effective than
secrecy but substantially less so than lead time, learning curve advantages,
and sales efforts.160 Focusing on the eighteen most heavily sampled
industries, they were able to establish “the limited effectiveness of patents
as a means of appropriation . . . . In only one industry, drugs, were product
patents regarded by a majority of respondents as strictly more effective than
other means of appropriation.”161 Patents were somewhat important in only
152
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three other industries: organic chemicals, plastic chemicals, and steel mill
products.162
Similar results were obtained in studies conducted in other
industrialized economies. In a study of Swiss firms published in 1995,
Harabi found that lead time and related advantages in manufacturing and
marketing presented the most important appropriation mechanism and
patent the least important mechanism.163 In an exhaustive comparative
study that accounted for 50% and 90% of R&D spending in Japan and
Sweden respectively, Professor Ove Grandstrand found that patents were by
and large the least important appropriation mechanism for Swedish firms,
and that marketing and lead time were more important.164 Lastly, in an
international expansion of the Yale survey, Professor Wesley Cohen and his
colleagues at Carnegie Mellon concluded that there are substantial nationand sector-specific differences in the use of patents, secrecy, lead times, and
other means for appropriation of the returns from innovation.165
Specifically, their results confirmed those from the Yale survey that patent
protection was not the most important appropriation mechanism for U.S.
firms.166 Lead time and secrecy were.167
Apart from the basic message that patent protection is not essential for
securing innovation in most industries, the foregoing empirical studies also
produced other interesting findings that may have important implications
for the patent-antitrust interface in developing countries. First, the widely
held belief among economists that patent protection is more important for
small firms than for large ones is not substantiated.168 In fact, Mansfield
concluded patent protection is equally important for small and big firms in
his survey, which is consistent with the results from a number of surveys in
the U.K.169 Economists have long believed that because small firms may
lack the financial means or experience to commercialize an invention, they
will need to rely on licensing mechanisms to transfer their inventions to
larger firms.170 Such licensing would only be possible if the invention was
162
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somehow propertized and capable of transfer for value, which the patent
system facilitates. The finding that patents are no more important for small
firms than for large ones is significant, because as one may recall,
achievement of broader development goals requires antitrust to pay
attention to the welfare of small- and medium-sized enterprises. To the
extent that patents were more valuable to small firms, and that small firms
in developing countries produce patentable innovations, there would be a
persuasive reason for developing countries to favor patent policy. That,
however, turns out not to be the case.
Second, again contrary to common belief, patents do not completely
eliminate imitation, but merely raise imitation costs. Mansfield and his coauthors discovered that despite patent protection, 60% of the surveyed
innovations were imitated within four years of their introduction.171 In fact,
for about half of the innovations, the firms felt that patent protection only
delayed entry by a few months.172 Patent protection increases imitation
costs by 30% in the pharmaceutical industry, 10% in chemicals, and 7% in
electronics and machinery.173 The Yale survey produced similar results,
concluding that patents did not prevent imitations, but instead raised
imitation costs by 40% for pharmaceuticals, 25% to 30% for chemicals, and
7% to 15% in electronics.174 Furthermore, the ability legally to invent
around a patented innovation was cited in the study as a major limitation on
the effectiveness of patent protection.175 Gilbert suggests that even in the
pharmaceutical industry, where patents are crucial, patent protection does
not preempt rivals’ efforts to invent around the patent or produce a similar
product.176 In fact, he noted that discovery of a new drug by one firm
usually spurs rivals to step up their R&D in the same therapeutic
category.177
The fact that patent protection does not forestall inventing around or
imitation is important because it means that the causal link between patent
protection and reward for innovation becomes more complex and tenuous.
New Technology-Based Firms, 33 RES. POL’Y 1141, 1141 (2004).
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One can no longer assume, as many economists tend to do in their
theoretical models, that patent protection generates financial reward for the
patentees.178 This will be particularly relevant when assessing the consumer
harm afflicted by a patent exploitation practice. To the extent that patent
protection inflicts consumer welfare loss without creating corresponding
innovation incentives, developing country antitrust authorities need to be
particularly cautious about patent exploitation practices that raise prices on
consumers.
Third, the information diffusion function of patent disclosure is much
less prominent than has been assumed. It was said earlier that patents
perform an important information diffusion function by allowing rivals to
learn about a new technology from patent disclosure.179 It turns out that the
value of this disclosure has been overstated. Taylor and Silberston
estimated that patent information only saves firms 0.75% of their R&D
expenditure, a saving which they call “infinitesimal.”180 Other authors have
confirmed the insignificant contribution of patents to information diffusion
as well.181 Attempts to justify patent protection on the grounds of
information diffusion are suspect.
3. Evidence from Developing Countries on the Need for Patent Protection
to Spur Innovation
All of the empirical studies cited in the previous subpart were
conducted in developed countries. Since the question is whether patent
protection spurs innovation in developing countries, studies done in these
countries would be preferable. Unfortunately, comparable surveys in
developing countries are rare. But all hope is not lost as there are
alternative types of evidence available.
One of the silver linings of the adoption of TRIPS is that it has
178

Where patent protections merely increase imitation costs, as opposed to completely
excluding rivals, the impact of patent protection on consumer welfare would partly depend
on the state of competition in the industry after rivals have successfully imitated the patented
technology. In this scenario, patent protection merely becomes a tool for the patentee to
raise costs of production for rivals. The magnitude of this increase provides a cushion to the
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provided a number of natural experiments on the relationship between
patent protection and innovation in developing countries. A great many
developing countries, such as India, Brazil, and Argentina, did not grant
product patents for pharmaceuticals prior to TRIPS, but were compelled to
amend their patent laws after the TRIPS Agreement came into effect.182
One can gauge the incentive effects of patent protection by observing
whether there was a substantial increase in pharmaceutical innovation after
the TRIPS-required reforms were put in place.
Pharmaceutical R&D expenditure did not experience any significant
increase in any of the developed countries surveyed by economists
following the TRIPS Agreement. Based on a number of economic studies
from Lebanon, South Korea, and Argentina, Maskus concluded that
pharmaceutical R&D in those countries was not expected to increase after
patent protection was introduced.183 Nogues conducted a detailed study of
the Argentine pharmaceutical industry, and similarly “found no reason to
expect an increase in domestic R&D in pharmaceuticals due to recognition
of product patents.”184 This is because “the development of new chemical
entities is outside the reach of local companies in any developing country,
since there are no firms in such countries big enough (in terms of total
sales) to finance the high costs of pharmaceutical R&D.”185 Maskus shares
a similar view, asserting that “[f]ew, if any, firms in developing countries
are likely to find it attractive to engage in fundamental R&D in competition
with the major international research-based pharmaceutical companies,
which have expertise in research and marketing and benefit from significant
economies of scale.”186
Another natural experiment can be found in Italy,187 which had not
granted patent protection to pharmaceuticals prior to 1978, when the Italian
Constitutional Court held that the denial of patent protection for
pharmaceuticals was unconstitutional.188 Up until then, Italy had boasted a
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vibrant generic pharmaceutical sector.189 In response to the Court’s
decision, the Italian Parliament amended the patent law to include
pharmaceuticals.190 Again, if pharmaceutical innovation boomed after the
amendment, one may conclude that patent protection does spur innovation.
Scherer found that after pharmaceutical patents became available in
Italy, there was no significant increase in pharmaceutical R&D expenditures
relative to world trends, no significant increase in the number of new drug
entities introduced by Italian firms, and a sharp deterioration of the Italian
balance of trade in drugs.191 Export sales plummeted and multinational
firms began to import many of their products into Italy from other European
countries.192 The domestic pharmaceutical firms were gradually taken over
by multinational firms,193 and generic production capacity moved from Italy
to India.194 Most tellingly, there was no emergence of significant domestic
innovators in the industry. In short, the supposed dynamic efficiency
benefits of patent protection did not materialize in Italy, just like in many
developing countries following TRIPS. The results of these natural
experiments are particularly persuasive evidence on the relationship
between patent protection and innovation because pharmaceuticals, at least
in developed countries, are heavily reliant on patent protection. Therefore,
one would expect the introduction of pharmaceutical patents to have a
pronounced incentive effect.
The experiences recounted here reveal an important reality about
innovation in developing countries: in some industries, innovation may be
so technically complex or resource-intensive that developing countries
simply do not have the capacity to innovate and compete globally.
Moreover, even if innovation may be less technologically or financially
demanding, the domestic industry may be so far behind the international
technological frontier that innovation is again currently unattainable. In
light of these arguments, Professor Carlos Correa has concluded that:
With the exception of a few developing countries which have been
able to build up a reasonable R&D infrastructure (such as the East
189
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Asian “Tigers,” India and Brazil), most developing countries are
unlikely to substantially improve their innovative performance just
on the basis of an expanded and stronger IPRs [intellectual property
rights] regime.195

As many industries in developing countries simply have no inventors
who can take advantage of the innovation incentives generated by the patent
system, the costs of a pro-patent policy are incurred in vain. This is
consistent with Stewart’s criticism of Jamaica’s decision to exempt
agreements related to intellectual property from the purview of antitrust
law: “Yet, there is little or no innovation requiring conferring of industry
property rights on locals, and there is ample historical evidence of firms
using monopoly power derived from intellectual property rights to create
barriers to entry by other [sic] or to divide up markets geographically.”196
Many of the least-developed countries are likely to be similar to Jamaica in
their lack of innovative capacity.197 These countries should not aim to
develop innovative capacity, but to acquire imitative capacity.198
While developing countries are capable of producing innovations,
economists have observed that developing countries tend to see more of the
process kind of innovations instead of the product kind.199 It has been noted
that it was through process innovations that the United States and Germany
caught up with the U.K. in the nineteenth century, and that Japan did the
same with the United States after the Second World War.200 These process
innovations are described as those “of the organizational type[,] that
allowed for simultaneous exploitation of scale economies and flexibility,
leading to high through-put, efficient inventory management, high
quality/reliability, and a proven ability to adjust to the needs of the enduser.”201 An example is the kanban, or just-in-time, manufacturing system
developed by the Japanese automobile industry to increase responsiveness
195
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to changes in consumer demand and to reduce inventory.202 The success of
the Japanese automobile industry—especially Toyota, which originated the
system—is too familiar to warrant repetition here.203 At this juncture, one
may recall a finding from the Yale survey that patent protection is the least
important appropriation mechanism for process innovations, which are
difficult for competitors to discover and understand merely from the final
product, and can be effectively protected through trade secret laws. This
means that developing countries have a weaker need to extend patent
protection to induce innovations, which are mostly of the process kind.
Another fact in support of the relative dispensability of patent
protection in developing countries is that most innovations originating from
those countries are likely to be incremental or adaptive. For example, the
Brazilian agricultural machinery industry is known for its successful
adaptations of foreign machines to the domestic environment that have
allowed it to dominate the Brazilian market.204 Most innovations from
developing countries are not patentable, because they are not novel or nonobvious enough to meet patentability standards.205 Providing patent
protection will not create incentives for these incremental innovations, but
will impose significant costs in terms of consumer welfare loss. A propatent stance in the patent-antitrust interface will have little impact on these
incremental innovations.
In conclusion, there is scant evidence that the extension of patent
protection in developing countries will lead to increased innovation. When
evaluating innovation-based claims in patent-antitrust cases, a developing
country antitrust authority must be mindful of the limitations of the
country’s innovative capacity. No developing country would want to repeat
Jamaica’s mistakes. In particular, the authority should consider whether
there is any innovative capacity in a particular industry, and if so, what kind
of innovation it is capable of producing, product or process, novel or
incremental.
C. Developing Countries Should Not Weigh Innovation Incentive
Externalities in the Patent-Antitrust Interface
With the advent of globalization, the innovation incentives generated
by a country’s patent system are no longer confined within its borders.
With increased trade and the possibility of FDI, these incentives may be felt
by foreign inventors as well. Given that the market for many innovations is
no longer domestic, a multinational inventor will consider the innovation
202
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incentives provided by its various markets when making an investment
decision. In short, innovation incentives spill over national boundaries and
can have substantial externalities. When considering the impact of its
decision in patent-antitrust cases, an antitrust authority may need to take
these externalities into account.
The question is whether a developing country antitrust authority
should pay heed to innovation incentive externalities. To formulate it
slightly differently, the question is whether such an authority should
consider the patentee reward accruing to foreign inventors when
determining the legality of a patent exploitation practice. For a small
developing country, the answer would seem to be negative. There are good
reasons to doubt that a multinational firm will consider the innovation
incentives provided by every market in which it operates. The fact that
most innovations are only patented in a limited number of jurisdictions
attests to this.206 A multinational firm will focus on its large markets,
including the industrialized economies and the large developing
countries.207 For small developing countries, the profit potential from their
domestic markets is so small that the technology investment decisions of
multinational firms are unlikely to depend on it.208 Even if one were to
aggregate the profit potential generated by these small developing countries,
it is unlikely to exceed a few percent of the global profit for a multinational
corporation.209 An invention that would have been abandoned with the loss
of a few percent of profit potential is unlikely to be groundbreaking and a
significant boost to global welfare. As Scherer noted, one wonders how
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much worse off society would be by foregoing such innovations.210
In contrast, the innovation incentives generated by large developing
countries may have a substantial impact on technological investments on a
global scale. This still does not mean that these countries should consider
innovation incentive externalities in patent-antitrust cases. The provision of
innovation incentives entails welfare transfer from consumers to
inventors.211 In the global context, this transfer flows from developing
country consumers to multinational firms.212 Given the impoverished state
of consumers in many developing countries, this tradeoff should not be
lightly made. A developing country antitrust authority cannot be faulted for
giving priority to the welfare of its downtrodden domestic consumers. If an
innovation is of sufficient global importance, developing countries are right
to wonder whether they should be the ones to provide additional incentives
through their patent systems.
Development economists have come up with a number of theoretical
models that predict the effect of strengthening intellectual property
protection in developing countries on innovation that originates from
developed countries. As far as innovation incentives are concerned,
strengthening patent protection and tightening antitrust restrictions on
patent exploitation have similar impacts. Surprisingly, and perhaps
somewhat counter-intuitively, these models consistently show that
innovation in developed countries will fall after developing countries raise
their intellectual property protection.213 Based on the international product
cycle, Carmelo Parello constructed a model to study the impact of
heightened intellectual property protection in developing countries on the
rate of innovation in developed countries and the rate of imitation in
developing countries.214 In the absence of FDI, Carmelo concludes that
improved protection induces a short-run slowdown in the innovation rate in
developed countries and impedes technology transfer by imitation.215
Edwin Lai supplements Parello’s analysis by examining the effect of
enhanced protection in developing countries on the rate of innovation in
developed countries when the means of technology transfer comprises both
imitation and FDI.216 When imitation is the only means of technology
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transfer, Lai’s conclusions are similar to Parello’s.217 When technology
transfer is accomplished through investment, Lai finds that both the rate of
innovation and the rate of imitation rise in response to enhanced protection
in developing countries.218 Although his analysis is slightly more
complicated, Helpman reaches the same result under the assumptions of no
FDI and low imitation rate.219 Lastly, a theoretical study by Glass and
Saggi lends further support to the conclusions from Parello, Lai, and
Helpman, positing that “if innovative firms expected slower loss of their
technological advantages they could earn higher profits per innovation,
reducing the need to engage in R&D.”220 In light of this considerable body
of literature, there is even less reason for a developing country’s antitrust
authority to consider innovation incentive externalities.
There is one possible exception to the above line of argument, which
concerns technologies that are only useful to developing countries. A prime
example is drugs for tropical diseases. Multinational pharmaceutical
companies consistently under-invest in the development of these drugs.221
For these products, the innovation incentives developing countries provide
will be critical. Development economists, such as Yong Yang, have
suggested that developing countries should cooperate to offer innovation
incentives to developed country inventors by forming what he calls
“cooperation coalitions.”222 Unfortunately, even with the aid of such
coalitions, the prognosis is unpromising for developing countries. Scherer
concludes that the number of new drugs introduced must treble in order to
compensate developing country consumers for the welfare loss they have
suffered as a result of the introduction of pharmaceutical patenting under
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TRIPS.223 Regrettably, he predicts that the number of new drugs would
only grow by 15.5%.224 The price that these consumers need to pay for
drugs that are uniquely demanded by them, that is, drugs for tropical
diseases, is arguably too high. Other policy interventions are necessary to
incentivize research on these drugs.225
To sum up, despite the spillover effects of innovation incentives from
developing countries, the antitrust authorities in a vast majority of them
would be doing their consumers a tremendous disservice by attaching
undue weight to innovative incentives. The exceptions may be large
developing countries, such as India, China, and Brazil, whose markets are
large enough that innovation incentive externalities from them may have
significant impact on global innovation.
D. Rethinking the Relationship between Antitrust and Innovation
Having explored the relationship between patent protection and
innovation, it is important to turn our attention to the relationship between
antitrust and innovation. How exactly do the two relate to each other? The
conventional understanding is that antitrust rules affect innovation by
altering the scope of patent exploitation, which in turn adjusts the patentee
reward.226 Antitrust interacts with innovation incentives by adjusting the
size of patentee reward through relaxing or tightening the scope of patent
exploitation. The more stringent the restrictions imposed by antitrust rules
on patent exploitation, the smaller the patentee reward, and hence, the
smaller the incentive to innovate. For instance, the scope of patent
exploitation can be tightened by prohibiting resale price maintenance of
patented product, by prohibiting market allocation under a licensing
agreement, or by prohibiting the imposition of post-expiration royalty in a
licensing agreement. These restrictions limit a patentee’s ability to
maximize its financial return on its invention, and hence, reduce the size of
its patentee reward.227 If there is a direct relationship between patentee
reward and innovation incentives, then the stringency of antitrust rules on
patent exploitation is inversely related to innovation incentives.228
However, as the foregoing demonstrates, patentee reward is not
necessary for generating innovation in many industries. The appropriability
conditions of these industries may be such that firms can recoup their R&D
costs without resorting to patent protection. This weakens the inverse
relationship between antitrust rules and innovation incentives and gives the
223
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patent-antitrust interface greater leeway to focus on consumer welfare loss
and other developmental considerations.
E. Summing Up
The foregoing theoretical discussion and review of empirical studies
firmly refutes the notion that patent protection is necessary for securing
innovation.229 The extent to which innovation incentives rely on the patent
system varies by industry. In most industries, firms are spurred to innovate
not by patentee reward, but by the need to secure a first-mover advantage.
The costs and time lag of imitation allow first-movers to reap substantial
profits before imitators enter the market. Brand loyalty further reinforces
this advantage. Lead time also allows the innovating firm to improve the
product before imitation appears.
Empirical studies by a great number of eminent economists have
repeatedly produced the same conclusion that patent protection is not the
most important motivation for innovation. First-mover advantage, learning
curve advantages, and sales and marketing efforts are consistently rated as
more significant in most industries. The secondary role of patent protection
for securing innovation is not unique to the United States; it is observed in
other industrialized economies as well. There are no doubt outliers in these
studies. The two most notable examples are pharmaceuticals and
chemicals. Outliers, however, should be treated as outliers, and should not
be allowed to hijack the entire policy discussion. As far as the patentantitrust interface is concerned, the dynamic efficiency gains of patent
protection have been overstated.
229
The discussion thus far has focused on the question of whether increased patent
protection will boost innovation, which in turn will hopefully promote economic growth.
The relationship between patent protection and economic growth being investigated is an
indirect one. Some economists have attempted to determine the direct relationship between
patent protection and economic growth. Their results have largely been inconclusive. Using
a regression model, Gould and Gruben measured the significance of patent protection to
growth prospects and found the coefficient for patent protection statistically insignificant.
David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in
Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 323 (1996). Ginarte and Park conducted an elaborate
study involving more sophisticated quantification of the strength of intellectual property
rights. Juan C. Ginarte & Walter G. Park, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic
Growth, 15 CONT. ECON. POL’Y 51 (1997). They actually found a negative correlation
between the strength of intellectual property protection and economic growth, although the
correlation was again deemed to be statistically insignificant. Finally, after an exhaustive
review of empirical studies, Professors Bessen and Meurer conclude that “the empirical
economic evidence strongly rejects simplistic arguments that patents universally spur
innovation and economic growth.” James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Do Parents
Perform Like Property? 21 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 08-08, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1103143. In sum, the
evidence showing that raising patent protection directly contributes to economic growth is
ambiguous at best.
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Developing countries should take care to scrutinize claims about
innovation incentives. In addition, they should adopt an industry-based
approach to the patent-antitrust interface. There are industries, such as
pharmaceuticals and chemicals, in which patent protection does promote
innovation.
Dynamic efficiency considerations hence should be
emphasized. For most other industries, however, the need to protect
innovation incentives is accordingly weaker, and hence, antitrust in these
industries should exhibit greater readiness to limit the scope of patent
exploitation. A reduction in the patentee reward in these industries is
unlikely to have a significant impact on innovation incentives or to cause
future innovations to deteriorate dramatically.
V.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND THE PATENT-ANTITRUST
INTERFACE
Apart from promoting innovation, it has been said that patent
protection induces technology transfer from developed country firms to
developing countries.230 The underlying rationale is simple. Multinational
firms would only transfer technology to a developing country when they
know that their technology is protected from imitation and they can reap the
full benefits of their inventions. Technology transfer redounds substantial
benefit to developing countries.231 A developing country can improve its
technological capacity in three main ways: domestic innovation (where
possible), domestic imitation (or unintentional technology transfer by
developed countries), and intentional technology transfer by developed
country firms. For developing countries that lack innovative capacity,
technology transfer is one of the two main ways in which new technology
can be acquired.232 For developing countries that lack even imitation
capacity, technology transfer is the only means for technological
progress.233 One may recall from the earlier discussion about economic
growth that technological progress is a key to economic growth. Therefore,
technology transfer could be a major engine of growth in developing
countries.
Economists have identified three main ways in which technology is
intentionally transferred: trade of technological goods,234 FDI, and
230
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licensing. In addition, there are three main ways in which technology is
unintentionally transferred: unauthorized imitation,235 reverse engineering,
and patent disclosure.236 When choosing between the various means of
intentional transfer, a multinational firm considers a number of factors.
Professor John Dunning has proposed the OLI paradigm for analyzing the
decision-making process.237 OLI stands for the advantages of ownership,
localization, and internalization.238 Ownership advantages—which include
“technology and information, managerial, marketing and entrepreneurial
skills, organisational systems, incentive structures, and favored access to
intermediate or final goods markets”239—identify the competitive
advantages of a multinational firm in the global market that will allow it to
extend its reach to multiple markets. Localization advantages—such as
“the costs and quality of particular factor endowments, the size, character,
and growth of domestic markets[,] and the policies of host government, for
example, taxes and fiscal incentives”240—determine whether the firm will
choose to produce the good in a foreign location and export it to the country
at issue, or to locate production facilities in that country. In other words,
localization advantages explain the firm’s choice between trade on the one
hand, and FDI or licensing on the other hand. Internalization advantages
are reasons “why a foreign firm prefers to retain full control over the
production process instead of licensing its intangible assets to local
firms.”241 The decision may be due to “high transaction costs involved in
regulating and enforcing licensing contracts.”242 It may also be attributted
technology has physically entered into the realm of the developing country. For technology
transfer to be meaningful, it must be conveyed to a producer that can replicate and practice it
in the future. After all, technology transfer must consist of transfer of tacit knowledge or
know-how, which usually must be done deliberately by the technology owner. Most
multinational firms exporting technological goods to developing countries do not transfer
their technology to local producers. Nor is tacit knowledge transferred. The technology is
only transferred to the extent that local producers are able to imitate or reverse engineer the
technology. Thus, trade of technological goods may in fact count as unintentional, or more
aptly, involuntary transfer of technology.
235
Imitation can be authorized or unauthorized. Authorized imitation is tantamount to
technological licensing. Unauthorized imitation is copying without consent, sometimes
called piracy by intellectual property advocates.
236
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237
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GLOBAL ECONOMY 116–44, 318–27 (2d ed. 2008).
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Id. at 96.
240
Id. at 324.
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Beata Smarzynska Javorcik, The Composition of Foreign Direct Investment and
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Evidence from Transition Economies, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH,
supra note 75, at 133, 136.
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to the legal regime. In other words, internalization advantages inform the
firm’s choice between FDI and licensing.
Among the three means of intentional technology transfer, FDI
probably provides the greatest developmental benefits on a developing
country while trade provides the least. Through trade, the developing
country only acquires the good at issue. Its terms of trade243 deteriorate as a
result.244 Any gains in terms of technological capacity would depend on its
ability to reverse engineer the technology from the product. If reverse
engineering is not feasible, the developing country actually enjoys little
technological gains. Meanwhile, FDI results in improved productivity,
which is clearly beneficial to a developing country.245 In addition, there
may be R&D spillover from the multinational firm’s local manufacturing
facility to its local rivals.246 The overriding question to be answered in this
Part is whether a pro-patent stance in the patent-antitrust interface in
developing countries can be justified on the grounds that technology
transfer will be facilitated.
The patent-antitrust interface implicates technology transfer in a
number of ways. The means of technology transfer that is most obviously
affected by antitrust law is licensing. Antitrust imposes a host of
restrictions on patent licensing practices that may influence licensing
revenue, which in turn augments or reduces the patentee’s incentive to
license.247 Alternatively, if excessive pricing is deemed to be a violation
under antitrust, as it is in some jurisdictions, antitrust may require the
patentee to lower its royalty or order compulsory licensing.248 This kind of
intervention will clearly have an impact on technology transfer.
To the extent that licensing conditions are tightly regulated by
antitrust, a patentee may choose to pursue FDI instead, or perhaps trade. In
this sense, the ability to circumvent antitrust restrictions can be said to be an
internalization advantage that steers the multinational firm to keep

243
“Terms of trade is the ratio of export and import prices.” OECD GLOSSARY OF
STATISTICAL TERMS 782 (2007). “Terms of trade” is otherwise defined as the price of a
country’s exports divided by the price of its imports. PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE
OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS THEORY AND POLICY 94 (6th ed. 2008).
244
Helpman, supra note 219, at 1274; Scherer & Weisburst, supra note 137, at 1014.
245
Andreas Waldkirch, The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico since NAFTA
16–20,
(March
2008)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1115300.
246
Economists, however, have cautioned that these benefits should not be overestimated
as some multinational firms have engaged in what is known as “enclave production,” which
greatly limits the R&D spillover effect. MASKUS, supra note 48, at 152.
247
For an overview of the restrictions antitrust imposes on licensing, see HOVENKAMP ET
AL., supra note 7, chs. 21–25.
248
For the treatment of the demand for excessive royalty by European Union law, see
RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 793 (2009).
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production in-house. Antitrust restrictions on patent exploitation practices
may also affect trade by limiting the patentee’s ability to tie the sale of a
patented product to an unrelated product, or by preventing the patentee from
specifying the resale price of the patented product.249 To the extent that the
latter is true, the patentee may, for example, choose to invest in the
developing country at issue and build its own distribution network to sell to
consumers directly. In contrast, absent restrictions on resale price
maintenance, the patentee may choose to export the good to the country.
Even though much of the trade and development economics literature
has only examined the relationship between changes in intellectual property
protection on the one hand, and trade flow, FDI, and technology transfer on
the other hand, its conclusions can be readily applied to the patent-antitrust
interface in most instances. A more pro-patent stance in the interface
broadens the scope of the patent exploitation and increases patentee
rewards. It is no different from increasing patent protection in the form of
longer patent duration or more vigilant enforcement. These policy changes
all result in an increase in patentee rewards. This is consistent with one of
the key insights of Professor Louis Kaplow’s analysis: there is little
economic difference between adjusting the patent length or the patent
scope.250 Therefore, for the purpose of the discussion in this Part,
expansion of patent protection and a relaxation of antitrust restrictions on
patent exploitation will be treated as qualitative equivalents as far as their
effects on patentee rewards are concerned.
A. Impact of Relaxation of Antitrust Restrictions on Patent Exploitation on
Trade Flow
Whether increased patent protection, and by extension a relaxation of
antitrust restrictions on patent exploitation, raises or lowers trade flow
depends on the balance of two effects: the market power effect and the
market expansion effect. Market power effect refers to the fact that
increased patent protection augments the patentee’s market power, and
reduces the elasticity of demand for its patented product.251 This allows the
patentee to raise price and still earn more profit. This, of course, would
require the patentee to reduce its export to the country at issue.252 More
permissive antitrust rules on patent exploitation would similarly allow the
patentee to extract more profit out of its patent by raising the price or
imposing restrictions on distribution. The result would also likely be a drop
in demand. Market expansion effect results from the elimination or
249
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marginalization of imitated products in the local market, increasing demand
for the patentee’s product.253 Similarly, reluctance on the part of antitrust to
compel licensing makes it more difficult for potential competitors to license
the patented technology to compete with the patentee’s product.254 Again,
potentially competing products are eliminated or marginalized.
Whether trade flow increases or decreases depends on the relative
strength of these two effects, which—economists have postulated and
subsequently confirmed—in turn depends on the size of the country and the
presence of local imitation or licensed production capacity. Maskus and
Penubarti hypothesize that “the market-expansion effect is likely to
dominate in larger countries with highly competitive local imitative firms,
while the market-power effect would be stronger in smaller economies with
limited ability to imitate. The effects would be expected to vary sector by
sector as well.”255 This prediction was largely confirmed by Smith, who
concluded that whether U.S. exports to a developing country increase or
decrease depends on the local imitation capacity.256
Trade economists generally believe increased trade enhances global
welfare and efficiency.257 Increased trade allows countries to utilize their
comparative advantages, improving allocative efficiency on a global
scale.258 This may lead to the conclusion that if increased patent protection
augments trade flow, developing countries should encourage trade by
relaxing antitrust rules on patent exploitation. One must, however, also
wonder whether it is in a developing country’s best interests to increase its
import of technological goods, which worsens the developing country’s
terms of trade, may cause balance of payment issues, and results in the
relocation of manufacturing facilities to developed countries.
Both Helpman and Scherer believe that worsening terms of trade will
be the likely consequence of increased intellectual protection for developing
253
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imitation, U.S. exports would actually fall as a result of improved intellectual property
protection. In these countries, the market-power effect dominates the market expansion
effect. In contrast, countries with strong imitation and weak patents would receive a greater
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country has high imitation capacity, improving intellectual property protection would
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countries.259 Scherer asserts:
[P]atent protection may shield product imports from imitative local
competition, permitting production to be centralized in some other
nation where economies of scale are exploited more fully or wage
conditions are more favorable. Lacking such patent protection,
MNEs may feel compelled to commence on-shore production260 in
order to neutralize “made-at-home” advantages enjoyed by
indigenous rivals.261

As argued earlier, there are reasons why developing country antitrust
authorities should not focus excessively on global economic efficiency.262
Given their underdeveloped or in some cases impoverished state,
developing countries are simply not in a position to sacrifice domestic
consumer and producer welfare for global allocative efficiency. This is
vividly illustrated by the previously mentioned example from Jamaica,
which exempts agreements pertaining to intellectual property from its
antitrust law at the expense of local consumer welfare.263
It is worth noting that even economists do not believe that adjusting
patent protection to increase trade flow is necessarily an efficient or optimal
outcome. Maskus notes that “the meaning of ‘trade distortion’ is inherently
ambiguous in the intellectual property context,”264 and that “[t]he optimal
pattern of production and trade [concerning intellectual property] is
generally unknown . . . .”265 If increased trade flow on its own is not
worthy of pursuit, developing countries should only strive for it if it
redounds other benefits to the country.
One possible benefit is that increased trade flow facilitates technology
transfer by allowing developing country producers to reverse engineer the
technology from the imported product. In order to do that, a developing
country firm only needs to import a small number of the product. Import
need not be done on a substantial scale to permit reverse engineering. In
fact, reverse engineering can be accomplished so long as the developing
country firm can acquire a sufficient number of sample products somewhere
in the global market.266 Therefore, facilitation of technology transfer as an
259

Helpman, supra note 219, at 1274; Scherer & Weisburst, supra note 137, at 1014.
On-shore production refers to production in the location where the good is sold. In
this case, the on-shore production occurs in developing countries.
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For an overview of how a developing country pursues reverse engineering, see
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incidental benefit of increased trade flow does not justify a pro-patent
stance in the patent-antitrust interface.
A second possible benefit is that increased trade flow promotes
growth, which obviously would be beneficial to developing countries.
Helpman, however, has concluded that openness to trade can increase or
decrease growth, and that the direction of the effect is ambiguous.267
Absent a stronger showing of benefits from increased trade flow, trade flow
effects should not be an important consideration in the patent-antitrust
interface in developing countries.
B. Impact of Relaxation of Antitrust Restrictions on Patent Exploitation on
Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment (FDI) creates numerous benefits for
developing countries. It brings in new technology and capital goods.268 It
increases local employment.269
It introduces new managerial,
manufacturing, and organizational techniques to the country.270 It also
stimulates local competition and may have spillover effects on local rivals
that indirectly enhance their efficiency.271 FDI may ultimately boost
economic growth, which is perhaps why developing countries so
assiduously court foreign investors.272 Therefore, to the extent that a propatent stance in the patent-antitrust interface attracts more FDI, it would be
a substantial boost to the economic prospect of a developing country.
This is where the matter gets complicated. Economists have not been
(2011) (discussing, at page 350, how Iran managed to reverse engineer the BGM-71 Tow
Missile).
267
HELPMAN, supra note 34, at 69.
268
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269
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270
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Maskus notes that many multinational firms “have been criticized as enclave producers that
fail to integrate effectively with the broader economy in ways that would facilitate learning.”
MASKUS, supra note 48, at 152. In a way, this is unsurprising, because it is in these firms’
interests to safeguard their technology and prevent leakage to the local competitors. Enclave
production may be exactly what many of them want. One must wonder why these firms
would want to disseminate their technology and invite local competition that would undercut
their profit.
272
The positive impact of FDI on growth depends on the quality of human capital in the
recipient country. Paul Romer, Idea Gaps and Object Gaps in Economic Development, 32 J.
MONETARY ECON. 543, 555 (1993); Eduardo Borenzstein, Jose de Gregorio & Jing-Wha Lee,
How Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth?, 45 J. INT’L ECON. 115, 122
(1998). With low educational attainment in the local population, FDI is unlikely to be much
of a boost to growth.
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able to determine the precise effects increased patent protection—and by
extension, the relaxation of antitrust restrictions on patent exploitation —
may have on FDI. After reviewing a host of theoretical studies, Maskus
concludes that “the relationships between IPRs and FDI are subtle and
complex. While the weight of the theory seems to lie on the side of a
positive impact, the overall impact is ambiguous.”273 The rationale
underlying this conclusion is intuitive. Intellectual property protection,
such as patents, is but one of many considerations for a multinational firm
when picking an investment destination. The firm will also consider market
size and growth, local demand patterns, transport costs and distance from
markets, low wage costs in relation to labor productivity, and natural
resources.274 If a destination country possesses an overwhelming advantage
in one or some of these factors, the country’s weakness in intellectual
property protection may be offset. Maskus notes:
[S]trong IPRs are insufficient for generating strong incentives for
firms to invest in a country. If that were the case, recent FDI flows
to developing countries would have gone largely to Sub-Saharan
Africa and Eastern Europe. In contrast, Brazil, China, and other
high-growth, large-market developing economies with weak
protection would not have attracted nearly as much FDI if
investment were heavily depended solely on IPRs.275

The indeterminate relationship between intellectual property protection and
FDI is confirmed by a vast body of empirical literature, which draws
conflicting conclusions on the issue.276
273
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Fortunately, there is some guidance on the issue. First, unsurprisingly,
the least developing countries receive very little FDI. 277 Regardless of their
patent policy, the limited domestic market, low productivity of local labor,
and underdeveloped human capital cause them to remain unattractive FDI
locations.278 FDI, thus, should not be a significant consideration for these
countries when deciding patent-antitrust cases. Meanwhile, countries with
larger populations are more likely to attract FDI in manufacturing
facilities.279 This is attributed to the desire of multinational firms to gain
proximate access to local markets.280 The extent to which patent protection
is a consideration in FDI also depends on the stage of production at which
the investment is targeted.281 Understandably, investment in R&D facilities
is most sensitive to the state of patent protection, while investment in sales
and distribution is the least dependent.282 Manufacturing components and
complete products, and rudimentary production facilities fall sequentially
between these investments in descending order of dependence on the state
of patent protection.283 The importance of market size in attracting FDI and
the disparate sensitivity of FDI in different stages of production to patent
protection together mean that large developing countries probably need to
consider the effect of the patent-antitrust interface on FDI.284 Lastly, the
impact of patent protection, and by extension, the patent-antitrust interface,
on FDI varies by sector. FDI in low-technology sectors and services, such
as textiles and apparel, hotel and tourism, and electronics assembly, does
RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 107 (Mitchell B. Wallerstein, Mary E. Mogee &
Roberta A. Schoen, eds., 1993).
277
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279
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not show much sensitivity to patent protection.285 In contrast, sectors that
employ sophisticated yet easily imitable technologies do.286
These empirical observations should help guide developing country
antitrust authorities as they decide the weight to accord to FDI
considerations in the patent-antitrust interface. In sectors in which
technology matters, a developing country antitrust authority should pay
close attention to how its patent-antitrust decisions influence incentives to
undertake FDI. This is particularly true if the country at issue is large and if
the stage of production is one for which technology and patent exploitation
is important. The authority should also be mindful of whether there is any
potential innovator in a particular sector. In the absence of any potential for
developing innovative or imitation capacity, patent policy should be
accorded less weight.
One final observation about relaxing patent-antitrust rules to attract
FDI to developing countries: such effort could turn into a race to the bottom
for developing countries. When the first developing country relaxes the
patent-antitrust rules, it may succeed in attracting FDI. When the second
country does the same, it may draw some of the first country’s FDI to itself
and more FDI from the rest of the developing countries. By the time all the
developing countries have adopted the same policy, FDI will be allocated
based on non-antitrust related considerations, just as it was before the race
began.287 The only consequence for these countries by relaxing the patentantitrust rules is to incur all the costs of relaxation, such as consumer
welfare loss, restricted access to basic necessities, and loss of domestic
imitation, with little corresponding benefit in technological progress. This
is especially true if the principal benefit of FDI is its spillover effects on
domestic rivals.
C. Impact of Relaxation of Antitrust Restrictions on Patent Exploitation on
Technology Licensing
The patent-antitrust interface has a direct impact on technology
licensing, as antitrust regulates the scope of patent exploitation. By
reducing a patentee’s licensing revenue and scope of action, tighter
restrictions on patent exploitation practices may steer patentees to choose
other forms of technology transfer, such as FDI or trade of technological
goods. For example, a prohibition of resale price maintenance imposed on
the licensees will most likely reduce the patentee’s profit.288 This may drive
285
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the patentee to seek other means of technology transfer or even abandon the
transfer altogether, which would be against the interest of developing
countries.
The extent to which antitrust authorities should be concerned about
technology licensing incentives in patent-antitrust cases depends on the
existence of domestic firms capable of licensing and commercializing the
technology. In the absence of these firms, effects on technology licensing
incentives deserve little weight in the patent-antitrust interface. Again, this
is likely to be true for the vast majority of least-developed countries. The
technological capacity to commercialize a licensed technology varies by
sector.289 The remaining developing countries are likely to possess some
capacity in this respect within certain industries. Outside of these
industries, however, developing countries need not give serious
consideration to licensing incentives in the patent-antitrust interface.
A decision by a multinational firm to eschew licensing is not
tantamount to abandonment of technology transfer altogether. The firm can
choose other means of transfer if the licensing environment proves
unfavorable. The important question then becomes whether developing
countries should prefer one means of transfer to another. As established in
the above discussion, of the three means of technology transfer, licensing is
probably the most beneficial to the acquisition of technological capacity by
developing countries. While trade of technological goods requires reverse
engineering, and the technological benefits of FDI may be constrained by
so-called enclave production, technology transfer by way of licensing is
direct and immediate. A multinational firm licenses its technology to the
local licensee. The firm most often also provides technical assistance and
transfers tacit knowledge and know-how to ensure that the licensee can
successfully implement and commercialize the technology.290 Local
technological capacity is unequivocally enhanced.
D. Conclusions
The foregoing discussion suggests that among the three means of
intentional technological transfer, trade of technological goods should not
be given much weight in the patent-antitrust interface. This is due to its
ineffectiveness as a means of technological transfer and its ambiguous
impact on the overall welfare of a developing country. Both FDI and
(Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2011) (noting that resale price maintenance results in higher prices
for products and maximized profits for manufacturers and retailers).
289
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licensing are important means of technological transfer and could
potentially have a beneficial impact on the domestic welfare of a
developing country. Compared to FDI, licensing is a more effective and
beneficial means of technological transfer, as tacit knowledge and knowhow are also transferred in the process. Licensing also avoids the problem
of enclave production that may limit the beneficial impact of technological
transfer on the domestic economy. The possibility of licensing, however,
depends on the existence of domestic firms that can utilize the licensed
technology. Likewise, the beneficial spillover effects of FDI on domestic
firms also depend on the technological capabilities of these firms.
Myriad factors affect a multinational firm’s FDI decision; patentantitrust rules are but one of the considerations. As suggested earlier, a
small least-developed country is unlikely to be an attractive FDI destination
anyway. Its antitrust authority need not pay much attention to FDI when
calibrating its patent-antitrust rules. For countries that are viable FDI
destinations, the extent to which patent-antitrust rules affect FDI varies by
the sector and type of investment. FDI in low-technology sectors are not
substantially affected by the patent-antitrust interface; the incidence of
patent-antitrust cases is likely to be lower in low-technology sectors. The
same is true for investment in sales and distribution. For other types of
investment in sectors in which technology plays a more important role,
countries will need to consider the impact of the patent-antitrust rules on
FDI. Given that patent-antitrust rules are likely to have direct impact on
licensing, technology transfer by licensing should be a relevant
consideration for patent-antitrust rules in developing countries. The weight
of this consideration is particularly great if licensing, as opposed to FDI, is
the preferred means of technology transfer by multinational firms.
VI. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN THE PATENT-ANTITRUST
INTERFACE
Aside from its impact on innovation incentives and technology
transfer, the patent-antitrust interface may have a host of other implications
for developing countries. First and foremost, a patent exploitation practice
may exacerbate the welfare loss that results from the grant of patent
protection. A patent exploitation practice may allow the patentee to raise
the price or restrict the distribution of a patented product even further. If
the patented product is a basic necessity, restriction of output raises broader
development concerns and inflicts further harm on developing countries
that may not be fully captured by the traditional welfare analysis.
Deprivation of basic healthcare and nutrition for a substantial part of the
population will impede a developing country’s ability to move up the
development ladder. Finally, refusal to license and other patent exploitation
practices that impair the domestic firms’ ability to imitate a patented
technology will retard the acquisition of technological capacity, which, as
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discussed, is critical to economic growth. These considerations are closely
examined in the ensuing discussion.
A. Permissive Patent-Antitrust Rules Result in Excessive Consumer
Welfare Loss
One of the most serious welfare consequences of permissive patentantitrust rules is loss in consumer welfare. After all, patentee reward comes
from monopoly profit for the patentee, which in turn must come from
consumers. It is textbook economics that following a price increase,
quantity demanded will fall and a deadweight loss will result.291
Most of the economic studies on the introduction of patent protection
and its impact on pricing and consumer welfare have emanated from the
pharmaceutical sector.292 They firmly establish that price increases will
follow the introduction of pharmaceutical patenting.293 The same result was
observed in China after the country voluntarily introduced pharmaceutical
patenting in the early nineties, well before the country acceded to the World
Trade Organization.294 These economic studies were equally unanimous on
the welfare effects of such price increases.295 Scherer estimates that the
total surplus accruing to consumers in least-developed countries under
competitive imitation is four times the surplus they realize under monopoly
pricing.296 The annual welfare loss to India following the introduction of
291
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pharmaceutical patenting was estimated to range from U.S.$162 million to
U.S.$1.26 billion, while annual profit transfer to foreign firms was
estimated to be between U.S.$101 million and U.S.$839 million.297 A
World Bank study showed that the welfare loss for Argentina, Brazil, India,
Mexico, Korea, and Taiwan would be in the range of U.S.$3.5 billion to
U.S.$10.8 billion, while between U.S.$2.1 billion and U.S.$14.4 billion of
profit would accrue to foreign patent owners.298
The welfare loss in developing countries is exacerbated by the highprice, low-volume strategy adopted by many pharmaceutical companies in
developing countries.
A deliberate decision has been made by
pharmaceutical companies to focus on the wealthiest customers in lowincome developing countries.299 For example, it was found in a crosscountry study of the price of Zantac that Mongolian consumers have to pay
nine times as much for the drug as Australian and New Zealand
consumers.300 Such shocking price discrimination against developing
country consumers inflicts further welfare losses.
Aside from general consumer welfare losses, spillovers from
innovation have contributed to a dramatic increase in the living standards of
the general public in the industrialized world over the last 2 and 1/2
centuries.301 Baumol argues that if innovators had been able to capture and
monetize all the private and social benefits of their innovations, society as a
whole would have been much worse off.302 A majority of the population
would continue to languish in severe poverty. Furthermore, spreading the
benefits of innovation to the general public in the form of improved
healthcare and education may help to improve labor productivity, raising a
developing country’s output level.
B. Impaired Access to Basic Necessities
From a development perspective, access to basic necessities such as
foodstuffs and medicine is particularly important. It is only when
developing country citizens are healthy and nourished that they can have a
chance of realizing their full potential and lift themselves out of poverty.
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297
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Access to basic medicine and education improves the productivity of the
workforce and the prospects of economic development for a developing
country.303 Therefore, in patent-antitrust cases involving basic necessities,
development needs should be given extra weight. A pro-patent stance in
patent-antitrust cases involving basic necessities may impair availability of
such necessities. TRIPS already provides for a mechanism for ordering
compulsory licensing in the event of a public health emergency under
Article 31.304 In situations not covered by this and other exceptions
contained in TRIPS, developing countries need to rely on domestic antitrust
laws to safeguard their consumers’ access to basic necessities. How this is
to be done will be elaborated infra in Part VII.
C. Stifling of Domestic Imitation
One possible consequence of a pro-patent stance in the patent-antitrust
interface is the stifling of technological development in developing
countries. After all, exclusion of rivals is the raison d’être of the patent
system. Lerner found that strengthening patent protection attracts a greater
number of foreign patentees, but domestic inventors’ patenting rate usually
slowed down after the change.305 Moreover, he found the slowdown effect
to be more pronounced in developing countries.306 Helpman argues that
growth rates across nations would converge if R&D spillovers were
international in scope and knowledge was shared across borders.307 On the
contrary: “If, for example, the R&D performed by these industrial countries
enhanced their common knowledge stock but did not feed knowledge into
the less-developed countries, then international R&D spillovers would
provide a major force of divergence between the rich North and the poor
South.”308 One of the most direct means of R&D spillover is imitation.309
The importance of imitation as a means for acquiring technological capacity
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is underscored by the experience of industrialized economies, many of
which suppressed patent protection in the early stages of their development.
History is replete with instances of countries eschewing patent
protection to allow themselves to catch up with the global technological
leader, which for most of the nineteenth century was the U.K.310 The
United States was a major culprit of intellectual property infringements in
the nineteenth century, copying patented technologies from the U.K. and
denying foreign authors copyright protection in order to give its low-cost
domestic printing industry a boost.311 The United States developed its early
industrial capacity by free-riding on the innovations developed by the
leading European nations. Examples include U.S. free-riding on the U.K.
for textiles, steam engines, and machinery, and France for gunpowder.312 In
fact, until 1836, foreigners were not allowed to obtain patents in the United
States unless they had resided in the country for at least two years and
declared their intent to naturalize.313 As the U.S. economy industrialized
and the number of domestic inventors rose, a growing demand for
heightened intellectual property protection emerged. In response, Congress
progressively increased the strength of patents and other intellectual
property rights throughout the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.314
A similar strategy of free-riding or cheap-riding was adopted by other
developed nations, such as Japan, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, in their
early stages of development.315 Japan’s patent system initially was
designed to facilitate technology transfer. It was only remodeled in the
1980s and 1990s to reflect its role as a major source of innovation in the
world. In the late-nineteenth century:
Japan did adopt a comprehensive patent regime, though its features
were distinctive from the American and major European systems. It
was designed to encourage industrial development through
emphasizing technology acquisition from abroad, domestic
information diffusion, and incremental innovation. In short, the
system was developed with the interests of a technology follower in
mind. The Japanese regime significantly limited patent scope and
breadth. For example, pharmaceutical patents were not provided
until the 1970s . . . . As Japan matured into an industrial power and
technological leader, features of its patent system attracted increasing
complaints from both foreign and domestic enterprises, leading to its
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reform in 1994.316

Similar to the United States, foreigners were initially barred from
applying for patents in Japan.317 This discriminatory policy only ended in
1899, when Japan acceded to the Paris Convention.318 Even after the
Second World War, the patent system and intellectual property were
generally only seen as “one component of a broader complex of policies for
trade, industry, and technology that focused on reconstruction and ‘catchup’ with the West, especially the United States.”319
Switzerland adopted a similar anti-patent strategy in its development.
Despite repeated attempts to introduce a patent system, Switzerland only
adopted one after the domestic watch industry had become threatened by
foreign imitation and technologically sophisticated enough to benefit from
it.320 Even then, the original patent law only provided protection to
mechanical inventions, but not chemical inventions.321 This was a
deliberate policy choice as the domestic watch industry only produced
mechanical inventions.322 Meanwhile, the emerging Swiss chemical
industry wanted to catch up with its more advanced German counterpart by
way of imitation.323 The domestic chemical industry, alongside the textile
industry—which also relied heavily on foreign technology—strongly
opposed the introduction of a patent system.324 It was, hence, in
Switzerland’s interest to deny patent protection for chemical compounds.
Switzerland did not extend patent protection to chemicals until Germany
threatened trade sanctions in 1907.325
Swept by the anti-patent movement that was fomenting in Continental
Europe in the mid-nineteenth century, the Netherlands abolished its patent
system in July 1869.326 The abolition was not entirely motivated by
strategic development concerns, and the patent system was eventually
reestablished in 1910.327 A number of economists have concluded that the
316
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Netherlands industrialized successfully in the absence of a patent system. 328
Even the U.K., a technological leader in the world for much of the
nineteenth and early-twentieth century, excluded chemical compounds from
patent protection in 1919 in response to the perceived might of the German
chemical industry.329
This brief historical overview shows that many industrialized
economies deliberately chose, as a strategy for technology acquisition, to
suppress patent rights to allow domestic industries to imitate cutting-edge
foreign technology. Their experiences lead to the inevitable conclusion that
“the patent system in particular, ha[s] been neither necessary nor sufficient
for historically significant technical and/or economic progress at national
and company level.”330 If the goal is the acquisition of technological
competence in the shortest time possible, developing countries should try to
facilitate domestic imitation rather than stifle it. Professors Boldrin and
Levine call imitation “a powerful tool of economic development” and “key
components of the competitive markets that benefit us on a daily basis.”331
It is only when the domestic firms have acquired the technological capacity
to imitate that these countries should turn their attention to spurring
domestic innovation.
This conclusion is supported by the experiences of a number of
developing countries, such as India, whose domestic pharmaceutical
industry blossomed after the country abolished pharmaceutical patents,332
and South Korea and Taiwan, which aggressively imitated technologies
from the United States and Japan, among others.333 In fact, the benefits of
imitation extend beyond the acquisition of technological capacity to the
attainment of more inclusive growth. As suggested earlier, inclusive
growth requires that the fruits of economic growth be shared broadly within
society,334 which means that small- and medium-sized enterprises should be
allowed to prosper. Studies show that such enterprises often engage in
imitative activity.335 Stifling of imitation, hence, would harm these
328
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enterprises and undermine the attainment of inclusive growth.
The most direct way to facilitate imitation is by lowering, or even
eliminating, patent protection. Many developing countries did just that in
the 1960s and 1970s with pharmaceutical patents.336 With the signing of
the TRIPS Agreement, this option is no longer available.337 The room for
adjusting the level of patent protection has been severely curtailed. One
possible way out of this quagmire is to adopt an aggressive stance in
antitrust enforcement in patent cases. By limiting a patentee’s ability to
impose restrictions on licensees, and perhaps by making it easier for rivals
to obtain a license from a patentee, antitrust can facilitate authorized
imitation.338
VII. SOME PROPOSED GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
A. Guiding Principles
Based on the foregoing discussion, a number of guiding principles can
be offered to developing countries on how they can adjust the prevailing
approaches to patent-antitrust cases in developed countries to suit their
particular needs. Given that antitrust law is most established in developed
country jurisdictions, developing countries will likely look to developed
country jurisprudence when confronted by novel patent-antitrust issues.
However, the crux of the argument in this Article is that developing
countries cannot blindly follow developed country approaches, and instead
need to tailor these approaches to suit their needs. The following are a
number of principles that will assist developing countries in this adjustment
process.
The first guiding principle is that developing countries need to be
prepared to ask tough questions about innovation-based justifications for
patent exploitation practices. Patent protection is not essential for
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generating innovation incentives in a great many industries.339 The
importance of patent protection depends on the appropriability conditions of
the industry at issue, and in particular, on the existence and relative
importance of other types of appropriation mechanisms, such as first-mover
advantages, brand and marketing, and learning curve advantages.340 While
developed country competition authorities may choose to ignore this large
body of evidence and continue to defer to innovation incentives-based
arguments for patent rights, developing country authorities are not in a
position to commit the same mistake. There are two reasons for this.
First, the patentee reward that is generated by supra-competitive
pricing ultimately is derived from consumers.341 While developed country
consumers may be wealthy enough to withstand a consumer welfare loss,
developing country consumers are not. Every penny lost to them may have
a real impact on their standard of living. Therefore, developing country
competition authorities should be very careful about incurring consumer
welfare loss.
Second, there are more potential innovators in developed countries to
benefit from the innovation incentives generated by the patent system and
preserved by the antitrust rules. The same is not true of developing
countries, especially the least-developed ones. The innovative capacity of a
developing country probably differs by sector. However, in general, it is
true that developing countries possess less innovative capacity than
developed countries.342 If a developed country accepts an innovation
incentives-based argument and upholds a patent exploitation practice, the
patentee reward still redounds to domestic firms. In a developing country,
the patentee reward is likely to go from the pocket of domestic consumers
to foreign firms, as there may be few innovators in the country to take
advantage of the innovation incentives generated by the patent system.
Therefore, developing country antitrust authorities must scrutinize
innovation incentives-based arguments more closely and be less deferential
to patent policy than developed country authorities.
A related issue is innovation incentives externalities. As suggested
earlier, the effect of innovation incentives generated by a domestic patent
system is not confined to its national boundary; a patent system may
provide incentives to foreign inventors as well.343 The extent to which that
is true depends on the size of the domestic market. While it may be true for
339
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some large, middle-income developing countries, for most of the leastdeveloped nations it is unlikely that the innovation incentives generated by
their domestic patent systems will be taken into consideration by foreign
inventors. Every developing country must come to its own determination
about two questions: (1) how likely it is that the innovation incentives
generated by its domestic patent system will be taken into account by
foreign inventors, and (2) even if the answer to question (1) is positive,
whether it wants to sacrifice domestic consumer welfare to incentivize
foreign inventors, many of which are multinational corporations. If the
answer to question (2) is negative, then that developing country’s
competition authority needs to attach even less weight to innovation
incentives-based arguments when tackling a patent-antitrust case involving
a foreign patentee.
A second guiding principle for developing countries is that a sectorspecific approach to patent-antitrust cases is required, given that the
importance of patent protection as a source of innovation incentives varies
widely by industry. While a de novo examination of appropriability
conditions in every case may be too time-consuming and resource-intensive
for any antitrust authority or court to undertake, a priori classifications of
industries can certainly be made to facilitate the analysis. A sector-specific
approach is also consistent with the finding that the importance of
innovation incentives to technology transfer and FDI varies by industry.
Third, developing countries need to bear in mind that the most
effective way for many of them to acquire technological capacity is by
imitation. This is what many developed countries themselves did when
they were moving up the global technological ladder.344 Given the
importance of technological progress to growth and development—as stated
earlier, growth rates will continue to diverge absent a technological catchup—developing country competition authorities should facilitate domestic
imitation of foreign technologies and technology transfer to the extent
consistent with conventional antitrust principles. Developing country
competition authorities should be more willing to impose a duty to license
on the patentee and to scrutinize licensing agreements for unduly excessive
restrictions on the licensees.345
Fourth, developing country competition authorities should be
particularly vigilant about protecting domestic consumer welfare.346 Given
the general impoverished state of most domestic consumers, they can illafford to sacrifice their welfare in the name of generating innovation
incentives. Some goods are likely to be much more important to domestic
consumer welfare than others. For example, access to basic necessities,
344
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such as foodstuffs and medicine, will likely have a more direct bearing on
consumer welfare than, say, access to luxury goods or fancy consumer
electronics. Not every consumer should be treated the same, even within a
developing country, especially given the severe income inequality prevalent
in most of them. A restrictive patent exploitation practice affecting a
technology that is so advanced and expensive that it is only consumed by
the wealthiest consumers deserves less attention than one that implicates a
basic necessity. The wealthiest consumers in a developing country are
often just as able to withstand a welfare loss as consumers in developed
countries. Meanwhile, a patent exploitation practice that curtails the supply
of basic necessities will have disproportionate impact on the poorest of
developing country consumers. A developing country antitrust authority
therefore should take a particularly pro-antitrust stance in cases involving
such a practice. This is especially true given that access to basic necessities
carries a special developmental dimension in that it affects an individual’s
ability to achieve self-fulfillment.
Fifth, the welfare of domestic small- and medium-sized enterprises
should feature prominently in the calculus of developing country
competition authorities. In particular, these authorities need to pay closer
attention to the effect of patent exploitation practices on domestic smalland medium-sized enterprises. This is because of the role played by these
enterprises in alleviating poverty and providing an opportunity for the
impoverished to improve their economic well-being. As noted earlier,
small- and medium-sized enterprises are often the most effective means for
the poor to move up the socio-economic ladder.347 Developing country
competition authorities should be wary of domestic small- and mediumsized enterprises being excluded from the market by patent exploitation
practices, denying their owners of the opportunity to move out of poverty.
Sixth, developing countries need to take the argument that a proantitrust stance on patent-antitrust cases may undermine technology transfer
and FDI with circumspection. The connection between the patent-antitrust
rules and technology transfer is complex and varied. As far as trade flow as
a means of technological transfers is concerned, it has been established that
a developing country firm only needs to import a small amount of the
relevant product to reverse engineer the technology.348 Import need not be
done on a substantial scale to permit reverse engineering.349 Therefore,
facilitation of technology transfer as an incidental benefit of increased trade
flow does not justify a pro-patent stance in the patent-antitrust interface. As
the OLI paradigm suggests, there are many factors that determine the choice
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of an FDI destination.350 The patent-antitrust rules are only a small part of
the calculus. Economic evidence fails to reach a conclusive relationship
between FDI and intellectual property protection, and by extension, the
patent-antitrust rules. Country-specific factors may affect the attractiveness
of the country as an FDI destination. For example, there are developing
countries that are such unattractive FDI destinations due to the size of the
domestic market and other reasons that even extremely favorable patentantitrust rules are not going to matter.351 These include the small and leastdeveloped countries.352 Meanwhile, developing countries with larger
populations may be more viable FDI destinations, and therefore may need
to be concerned with how its patent-antitrust rules affect FDI.
The seventh point is one that has not been raised earlier, but is a
necessary implication of the foregoing analysis and discussion. The
imperative of protecting consumers from supra-competitive pricing and
domestic firms from being denied opportunities to acquire imitation
capacity means that developing country antitrust authorities may need to be
more vigilant against excessive pricing and more ready to order compulsory
licensing.353 For a product that incorporates a highly valuable and perhaps
unique technology, there may be no meaningful close substitutes in the
market, and the patentee may possess so much market power that it can
maximize its reward without engaging in any restrictive patent exploitation
practices. All it has to do is sell the product at a monopolistic price. In
these circumstances, the only way for the antitrust authority to alleviate the
consumer welfare loss is either to find the patentee guilty of excessive
pricing and impose some sort of price regulation remedy, or to order
compulsory licensing to introduce competition into the market. If the
product is a necessity, and the industry at issue is one in which patent
protection is only a secondary source of innovation incentives, the
justification for the proposed intervention would be strong.
It is true that most developed country antitrust authorities are averse to
imposing price regulation. The desire to avoid such regulations was one of
the reasons cited by the United States Supreme Court in refusing to impose
an antitrust duty to deal in Trinko.354 Yet developed and developing
countries may stand in different stead as far as the need for price
interventions is concerned. Some economists have argued that developing
countries should impose price regulation of some kind to alleviate the
harmful effects of patent protection, especially for pharmaceutical
350
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products.355 The Indian government has long regulated the prices of
medicine.356 Such regulation is usually administered by some sectoral
regulator instead of the antitrust authority.357 To the extent that price
regulation is already handled by a different government body, a developing
country’s antitrust authority can take a more hands-off approach. However,
not every good is subject to price control, and antitrust authorities may
confront cases involving products that are not subject to such control. In
those cases, a remedy of price regulation of some kind may be called for.
Compulsory licensing is equally, if not more, controversial than price
regulation within the antitrust circles.358 It is controversial because it is
considered a direct affront to the very essence of a patent: the right to
exclude competitors. Moreover, it contradicts the nature of patents as a
property. In developed countries, especially in the United States, private
property is highly respected and a government order to compel sharing of
private property is regarded with the utmost suspicion, and rightly so.
Compulsory licensing, however, is also superior to price regulation as a tool
for tackling supra-competitive pricing.
First, compulsory licensing
introduces competition to the market.359 Not only will the price be lower
for consumers, competition will also hopefully induce the firms to cut costs
and achieve production efficiency. Allocative efficiency is likely to be
improved by compulsory licensing as compared to a price-regulated market.
Second, compulsory licensing creates a huge benefit to developing
countries by allowing local firms to practice advanced technology.360 This
will result in a boost to the local technological capacity. The fact that a
number of firms now practice the technology also increases the probability
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and quality of further improvements and cumulative innovation.
Commentators have argued that the firm best able to make follow-on
innovations need not be the original inventor.361 Increasing the availability
of a technology improves the probability of follow-on innovation.
Notwithstanding property rights-based arguments, the strongest
objection to compulsory licensing has usually been that it undermines
innovation incentives. The standard theoretical argument is that if potential
inventors know that they will be subject to compulsory licensing, they will
be less willing to invest in creating new inventions.362 To the extent that
innovation incentives depend on patentee reward, this argument has great
intuitive appeal. This argument, however, is not supported by the empirical
evidence. Both Scherer and the Yale survey found that compulsory
licensing does not undermine innovation incentives in most industries.363
These results are consistent with the central conclusion from the bulk of the
studies discussed in Part IV that patent protection is not the most important
source of innovation incentives for most industries. The only two industries
which the Yale survey identified as being adversely affected by compulsory
licensing were the metal container and electron tube industries.364 For the
remainder of the industries covered in their exhaustive survey, compulsory
licensing was not deemed to be an important concern.
Compulsory licensing is, in fact, not as rare as it is generally believed
to be. U.S. antitrust authorities have regularly imposed compulsory
licensing in Section 2 monopolization and merger cases in the past. For
example, the GE-Westinghouse monopoly over the electric lamp was
broken by royalty-free compulsory licensing.365 AT&T was ordered to
license 9,000 of its patents in 1956.366 In both cases, there was no
observable deterioration in innovation incentives.367 Until TRIPS came into
effect and Canada joined NAFTA, both the U.K. and Canada had
compulsory licensing laws. The U.K. law applied to all kinds of products
while Canada’s only applied to pharmaceuticals.368 Canada’s law, in
particular, was utilized extensively: 227 licenses were issued between 1969
and 1977.369 In short, developing countries should not shy away from
compulsory licensing if it is warranted by an antitrust violation.
361
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Commenting on the general aversion to compulsory licensing in the U.S.
antitrust circles, Professor Herbert Hovenkamp asserts that “ordering
compulsory licensing for a proven antitrust violation is no different than
fining a firm or ordering divestiture of a plant. While we do not want to
deter innovation, we do want to deter antitrust violations either.”370
Professor Hovenkamp was right to observe that we want to deter antitrust
violations, especially those that directly undermine the growth prospects of
developing nations.
Compulsory licensing would only be a meaningful remedy if there
were other producers in the local market capable of commercializing the
technology. If there are no local producers in a particular industry, as is
likely to be case in many small developing countries, there would be no one
to whom to license the technology. While compulsory licensing as an
antitrust remedy need not be granted to domestic producers, Article 31 of
the TRIPS Agreement requires the products produced under compulsory
licensing to be predominantly for local use.371 Commentators have disputed
the precise scope of this limitation.372 However, it is unlikely that largescale export of products produced under compulsory licensing would be
compatible with Article 31. Therefore, for a developing country that
possesses no local capacity to manufacture the product, and whose market
is too small to allow foreign firms to reap sufficient scale economies to
build a local plant, direct price regulation may be the only feasible remedy
available to its antitrust authority.
B. Illustrative Examples
How these guiding principles can be applied in real cases can be
illustrated with a number of examples. Assume that a multinational
agricultural product company has developed a genetically modified seed
that produces a significantly improved yield. The company would only sell
the seed to farmers in a least-developed country if that country’s farmers
also purchase fertilizers from the company. The market share for the seed
is less than 30%. This is a typical tying case.373 Further assume that this
seed is for a staple in this country—many residents of this country rely on it
as their basic foodstuff—but the country has no current innovative capacity
370
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in genetic engineering and modification of agricultural products, and no
realistic chance of developing any such capacity. There are simply no
agricultural companies in the country engaged in any meaningful genetic
research at the moment. The country is also too small and too deficient in
human capital to be a viable FDI destination for multinational agricultural
companies. Meanwhile, there are small domestic enterprises producing
fertilizers that would be excluded from the fertilizer market by the
multinational company’s tying conduct. The multinational company
justifies its tie on the ground that it needs to maximize its returns from its
patented genetically modified seed.374
Tying would be analyzed under U.S. antitrust law under the modified
per se rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish Hospital
District No. 2 v. Hyde.375 Under this modified per se rule, the plaintiff must
show that: (1) there are two separate products; (2) the defendant has
substantial market power in the tying product market; (3) there is actual
evidence that the seller has coerced the buyer to accept the tied product; and
(4) the amount of interstate commerce affected in the tied product market is
not insubstantial.376 Jefferson Parish has been understood to establish a
presumption that less than 30% market share is insufficient to satisfy the
market power in the tying product market requirement.377 Therefore, the
tying practice of this multinational company would be unlikely to be held
illegal under U.S. law.
However, the competition authority of this developing country would
be well-advised to look beyond U.S. law and to apply a more stringent
standard to this tying practice for a variety of reasons. First, to scrutinize
the innovation incentive argument put forward by the defendant, the
developing country at issue is a very small one, and hence the profits
obtained from this country are unlikely to feature prominently in the R&D
investment calculus of the company at issue. Moreover, the competition
authority may rightfully wonder whether welfare of the consumers in this
country should be sacrificed to generate innovation incentives for this
multinational corporation. Second, the tie is likely to have substantial
impact on the consumers and fertilizer producers of the country.
Presumably the defendant is selling the fertilizer at a higher price than the
prevailing domestic price. If domestic farmers are forced to pay a higher
price for fertilizers, they may be compelled to raise the price of their
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produce. Given that the crop is a staple in the country, an increased price is
likely to have a pronounced impact on consumer welfare. The tie is also
said to exclude domestic fertilizer producers from the market. Domestic
small- and medium-sized enterprises are set to suffer as a result. Lastly,
given that there are no domestic agricultural companies engaged in highlevel research at the moment and the country is not a viable FDI destination
for multinational agricultural companies, the competition authority need not
worry about the impact of its decision on technology transfer or the
development of domestic innovative capacity. The competition authority of
this developing country should prohibit this tie.
As another example, assume that in a rapidly industrializing
developing country with a fairly large population, there is a firm developing
a technology in food processing that will compete with the prevailing
international standard. However, for the firm to successfully produce
products incorporating this new technology, it must obtain licenses to some
technology held by a foreign firm that currently deploys the internationallyprevailing technology. To forestall emerging competition, the foreign firm
refuses to license the required technology to the domestic firm. As a
rapidly industrializing developing country with a substantial population, it
is a viable FDI destination. There are a sufficient number of domestic firms
in the relevant industry that can benefit from technology transfer from
developed country firms. Also, a substantial number of firms possess
imitative and innovative capacity in the industry at issue.
Under prevailing U.S. antitrust law, it is exceedingly difficult to
prevail in a unilateral refusal to license claim. Under the leading case on
this issue from the Federal Circuit, In re Independent Service Organizations
Antitrust Litigation (Xerox), a patentee’s refusal to deal will not be
questioned absent fraud on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, sham
litigation, or illegal tying.378 In Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems
Support Corp., the First Circuit did not go as far as the Federal Circuit, but
nonetheless proclaimed that “while exclusionary conduct can include a
monopolist’s unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an author’s desire to
exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid
business justification for any immediate harm to consumers.”379 Even in
the more permissive case of Image Technical Services v. Eastman Kodak,
the Ninth Circuit only upheld an imposition of a duty to deal because the
court found that the defendant’s intellectual property justification for
refusing to deal was only pretextual.380 According to these leading cases,
unilateral refusal to license is practically presumptively legal under U.S.
antitrust law. Should the competition authority in this country deviate from
378
379
380
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prevailing U.S. law and condemn the unilateral refusal to license the
required technology?
Imposing a duty to deal is the most direct affront to the patent right to
exclude. Hence, it directly implicates the innovation incentive rationale of
patent rights. In deciding whether to impose a duty to deal, the competition
authority of this country should be reminded of the copious economic
evidence that patent protection is not essential for generating innovation
incentives in every industry. Food processing is not one of the industries
which economists have found to rely on patent protection for innovation
incentives.381 Therefore, imposing a duty to deal over this technology will
have less direct impact on innovation incentives. Yet, the calculus for this
competition authority is somewhat complicated by the fact that the
innovation incentives generated by the domestic patent system benefit both
foreign and domestic firms. As noted earlier, domestic firms in the industry
also possess innovative capacity. Therefore, setting a precedent of
imposing a duty to license may affect both foreign and domestic firms.
Also, the competition authority must be mindful of how imposing a duty to
deal may affect technology transfer and foreign investment, as the country
is a viable FDI destination and there are domestic firms that may benefit
from technology transfer. The authority will have to undertake a detailed
analysis of the likely impact of imposing a duty to deal on foreign
investment and technology transfer. Against all these potentially adverse
impacts is the facilitation of the acquisition of domestic innovative capacity
by the firm seeking to license and possible lower prices for consumers after
the introduction of a competing technology. The authority may want to
take into account the fact that the refusal to license was motivated by a
desire to forestall competition from an emerging technology. It will need to
balance all these countervailing considerations to reach a conclusion. As
compared to the prevailing U.S. approach, a developing country
competition authority must demonstrate greater willingness to question the
extent to which patent protection is needed to generate innovation
incentives. It must also consider a wider range of development-related
considerations.
VIII. POSSIBLE CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSED GUIDING
PRINCIPLES
A. Compatibility with the TRIPS Agreement
One possible criticism of the guiding principles proposed above is that
they may be incompatible with the TRIPS Agreement. The TRIPS
Agreement mandates a minimum level of patent protection by all member
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states,382 and hence, may restrict the ability of developing countries to
curtail patent protection by way of antitrust law.383 In particular, the TRIPS
Agreement prohibits the institution of different levels of patent protection
for different industries.384 This may further restrict the flexibility of action
for developing countries.
Fortunately, the TRIPS Agreement expressly allows member states to
enact measures to control anticompetitive practices related to intellectual
property rights. First, Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement allows member
states to adopt appropriate measures “to prevent the abuse of intellectual
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology.”385 Article 8 is said to contain a proportionality requirement,
and antitrust restrictions of patent exploitation may not be excessively
broad.386 However, it has been said that this requirement still leaves “a
large margin of application to Member countries, since it is their role to
determine what represents an abuse of intellectual property rights.” 387
Furthermore, Article 40 specifically allows member states to adopt
measures to control anticompetitive practices in the patent licensing
context.388 Under Article 40, an anticompetitive practice is defined as a
practice that “constitute[s] an abuse of intellectual property rights having an
adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.”389 Member states
enjoy considerable leeway in their interpretation and application of this
phrase.390 Article 40 enumerates three examples of anticompetitive
practices: exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges
to validity, and coercive package licensing.391 These three examples are not
exhaustive and a member state is free to specify further examples of
anticompetitive practices.392 Moreover, Article 40 requires member states
382
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to determine the legality of a practice on a case-by-case basis.393 This is
understood to require a Rule of Reason analysis of allegedly
anticompetitive practices.394
The TRIPS Agreement is unlikely to pose obstacles to the application
of the proposed guiding principles. The regulation of anticompetitive
practices related to intellectual property rights is expressly permitted by
Articles 8 and 40.395 The flexibility of application allowed by both articles
means that developing countries should have the ability to apply the guiding
principles proposed in this Article for patent-antitrust cases. Professor
Eleanor Fox has argued that TRIPS does not impose a categorical limit on
how far domestic antitrust law can restrict intellectual property rights, but
instead allows for a case-by-case approach to ascertaining these limits.396
She further argues that under TRIPS, there is an implicit presumption that
“existing developed systems of antitrust are presumptively legitimate.”397
Therefore, as long as the approach fashioned by the developing countries
does not deviate significantly from the existing approaches of the
established jurisdictions, it should be compliant with TRIPS.
Moreover, the proposed guiding principles do not call for a per se
approach, but instead requires a case-by-case evaluation that is required by
Article 40. In any case, it has been suggested that Article 40 should not
prevent developing countries from adopting per se approaches to the
regulation of patent exploitation practices or other approaches that “form
part of the traditional antitrust enforcement used by some countries.”398
Given the prevalence of Rule of Reason balancing approaches in developed
country jurisdictions, it can hardly be argued that the application of the
guiding principles proposed in this Article is inconsistent with the
international mainstream.
The TRIPS Agreement requires national treatment and does not allow
member states to discriminate against foreign right holders.399 One may
argue that according different weights to the interests of domestic and
foreign inventors may run afoul of the principle of national treatment.
While this principle requires formal equality of treatment between foreign
and domestic right holders, it is unlikely to go so far as requiring the
interests of domestic and foreign right holders to be given equal weight in
the analysis undertaken in administrative or judicial proceedings.
393
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B. Administrability
A second possible criticism of the proposed guiding principles is that
they are too vague to be applied. It may be further argued that the range of
issues to be considered in the application of the guiding principles is
beyond the capability of any antitrust authority, let alone those in
developing countries, to decide. Antitrust authorities and courts are simply
not equipped to weigh policy factors such as the impact on FDI or the
degree of necessity of a product.
While there is some truth to these claims, the alternative would be to
ignore all these vital developmental concerns and decide patent-antitrust
cases under a veil of willful obliviousness to the reality of developing
countries. The result would be decisions that stifle technological progress,
inflict harm on downtrodden consumers, and retard the growth and
development of these countries. The adjustment under the guiding
principles is marked by considerable open-endedness, and mistakes may be
made in the process. However, the best is the enemy of the good. The fact
that a comprehensive framework that attempts to take into account all the
relevant policy considerations cannot be applied in a precise manner does
not mean that these considerations should be dropped from the analysis
altogether. A simple rule that permits all patent exploitation practices short
of cartel conduct would be easy to administer, but would no doubt be
detrimental to developing countries. Instead, antitrust authorities should
strive to incorporate relevant considerations and come to the best decision
under the circumstances.
The reality is that Rule of Reason type balancing in antitrust cases will
always require judgment calls in close cases. These judgment calls are
made in light of the general jurisprudential and socio-economic
presumptions in a particular jurisdiction. In the United States, the
presumption is that competitive markets work, and thus, courts tend to err
on the side of non-enforcement in close cases to give markets the
opportunity to rectify the anticompetitive conduct. Other jurisdictions have
less faith in the market and therefore tend to err on the side of enforcement
in close cases. Similarly, in patent-antitrust cases, developing country
authorities can decide close cases with the view that when in doubt, err on
the side of protecting domestic consumers and potential imitators. In a
way, the guiding principles identified in Part VIII can be treated as
presumptions that break the tie in close cases.
IX. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes some guiding principles for the patent-antitrust
interface that incorporates a broad range of developmental concerns. It
argues that such a guiding principles will better suit the circumstances of
developing countries and ensure that the opportunities they have to achieve
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economic growth and development are not needlessly lost. The approach in
this Article has two implications that resonate beyond the immediate topic
of the patent-antitrust interface in developing countries. First, even for
developed jurisdictions, such as the United States, this Article demonstrates
that patent protection is not the most important source of innovation
incentives in most industries. This means that the antitrust authorities and
the courts in these jurisdictions should re-examine the deference they have
shown to patent policy. The pendulum may have swung too far and the
patent-antitrust interface in these jurisdictions needs to be brought back to
the middle ground.
Second, for global antitrust, this Article is an implicit challenge to the
drive for convergence that has consumed the international antitrust
community in the last decade. One of the underlying premises of this
Article is that antitrust principles and doctrines need to be tailored to
domestic economic circumstances. Markets and economies function
differently in different countries and antitrust law needs to reflect these
differences. Legal doctrines that have served developed countries well are
not necessarily suitable for developing countries. This is a particularly
important lesson for developing countries as they are prone to copy the
approaches of established jurisdictions without local adaptation. The
exemption granted by the Jamaican antitrust law for intellectual property
agreements vividly illustrates the danger of such an indiscriminate
approach. Meanwhile, advocates for convergence should become aware of
the limits of a one-size-fits-all approach. Convergence has undoubtedly
been a positive development in international antitrust, but it can backfire if
pushed too far. In the context of patent-antitrust cases, especially those
involving foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals, the consequence in developing
countries of injudicious convergence could be dire.
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